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ABSTRACT 
CATHAY LIU: Unification in Descartes’ Philosophy of Mathematics 
(Under the direction of Alan Nelson) 
 
 
I argue that Descartes unified mathematics in a rather striking and strong way.  He 
held that there was a single shared subject matter of all mathematics, that the objects of 
mathematics are ontologically identical to extended substance. 
The most entrenched conception that I argue against in my dissertation is the view 
that for Descartes mathematical objects—particularly numbers—have some sort of 
ontological status independent of material extension.  It is easier to see that geometrical 
objects such as triangles depend on geometrical extension or reduce to extension but similar 
claims about the dependence on extension for numbers or other abstract, arithmetic, or 
algebraic objects doesn’t not seem as immediately plausible.   
I argue that the best way to understand Descartes’ views about mathematics is to see 
that Descartes viewed numbers as epistemically and metaphysically dependent on extension.  
I give three arguments for this view.  
The first argument I offer is based on ontological problems with mathematical 
realism as an interpretation of Descartes.  Many commentators have thought Descartes is 
best understood as having some form of realism about the universals in our mathematical 
cognitions.  Problems for these realist readings arise when the need to ontologically locate 
  iv 
the universals conflicts with central Cartesian metaphysical doctrines.  The alternative is a 
nominalism about mathematical objects.  
The second argument I offer is found in Descartes’ concept of numbers.  There I 
show that in order for numbers to be conceived at all, a prior idea of extension (specifically 
its divisibility) must be contained in the idea. Without the idea of the nature of extension, 
there can be no idea numbers. Knowledge of extension is epistemically prior to and 
necessary for mathematical knowledge.  
The final argument concerns Descartes’ unification of algebra and geometry.  I show 
that the best account of Descartes’ mathematics is given using this way of distinguishing the 
metaphysical and epistemic unity and priority between algebra and geometry. Descartes’ 
development of analytical geometry exhibits the dependence of number on extension 
through the dependence of algebra on geometry and the priority of geometrical magnitudes 
to discrete algebraic multitudes.   
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Chapter 1:  Mathematics and Metaphysics 
Introduction To The General Topic 
Imagine you have developed mild myopia.  An optometrist examines you to 
determine the degree of refractive error in your vision, i.e. how far away from your retina 
two parallel rays of light entering your eye are being focused.  Then using the relationships 
between some triangles, and curved lines that she diagrams, she determines the shape of a 
particular parabola (the anaclastic curve), which she explains is the shape of the refracting 
surface of the lenses you will need to properly focus those parallel rays of light at a single 
point on your retina.  She expresses this curve as an equation, and gives it to the lens grinder.  
The lens grinder uses the equation to grind the lenses into the appropriate shapes to produce 
your glasses. 
Consider what needed to take place in the scenario above.  The optometrist and lens 
grinder relied on a special relationship between various physical magnitudes and qualities 
(distances, shapes of surfaces, etc.) and mathematical facts (geometrical depictions of 
triangles, and curves, expressed as numerical equations, etc).  Further examples of this 
assumed special relationships between (a) algebra and geometry, and (b) mathematics and 
physics, are legion. But such associations are crucial; the development of empirical science 
relied heavily on our ability to characterize its phenomena in mathematical terms. In this 
sense, the seamless alternation between physical objects like lenses and mathematical objects 
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like triangles, curves, and equations illustrates nothing less than the birth of the modern 
world. 
With our physics so desperately dependent on mathematics today, we myopically see 
connection between equations, geometrical diagrams, and the physical world as obvious and 
even un-mysterious.  But a historical perspective of the development of mathematics, its 
applications, and also the development of physics will quickly expose that these assumptions 
we have today have not always been obvious or given or taken for granted.  Physics was 
hardly mathematical: numbers and equations had nothing to do with final causes, efficient 
causes, nor any other Aristotelian cause that had ruled the sciences for many centuries 
previous.  Similarly, it was not always the case that there was the ready acceptance of “pure 
mathematics” or even the unification of algebra and geometry.  In the earliest days, geometry 
was merely, literally, a geo-metry: a technique used to measure parcels of land for the 
purposes of calculating tax burdens and strategic farming along the Nile river.  Mathematics 
was very much a practical, and applied craft, as opposed to a pure, theoretical and abstract 
science that we practice today. 
 The turning point for what is no less than the birth of the modern world, as we now 
understand it, depends vitally on the use of mathematics in our physical sciences.  This single 
handedly opened up the door to the scientific revolution, the development of calculus, 
advances of leaps and bounds in optics, astronomy, mechanics… etc.  None of this would 
have occurred had not the applied classical geometry come together with what was seen as 
questionable algebraic methods to produce analytic geometry.  What was required was the 
systematic unification of algebra with geometry, and mathematics with physics. 
The above example of the anaclastic line is just one of many examples that is 
emblematic of the radical changes occurring during the early modern period as the 
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mathematics and sciences surged forward.  It embodies the various unifications that set the 
ground for everything to come in the next two hundred years. And in the center of this 
exciting change and the surge of our ability to understand the world was a figure who had a 
hand in it all: Rene Descartes. 
Descartes plays a central role in the modern understanding of the relationship 
between mathematics and empirical science. He made revolutionary contributions to both 
mathematics (e.g., his analytic geometry which unified geometry and algebra), and to physics 
and optics (e.g., his conservation laws, the sine law of refraction, and the determination of the 
anaclastic curve), which, moreover, were often characterized in a mathematical fashion: a 
mathematical-physics.  
Like other philosophers of the early modern period there were important and 
pressing fundamental questions about the relationship between the mathematical and the 
empirical that required answers. An interpretation of Descartes’ answers to these questions 
needs to account for his philosophical views about numbers and the relationship between 
algebra and geometry such that he could unify them in a single mathematics allowing then 
for the connection between mathematics and physics to be addressed.  Much work has been 
done over the years to examine his physics, and the metaphysics underlying it.  But it is to 
Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics, and particularly its metaphysical underpinnings that I 
will explore here. 
The Arguments For My Interpretation: An Overview 
This more limited topic of his philosophy of mathematics to which I have confined 
myself is only a small portion of the more ambitious topic of his mathematical-physics. In 
what follows, I argue for a particular interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics.  
My claim is that Descartes unified mathematics in a rather striking and strong way.  He held 
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that there was a single shared subject matter of all mathematics, that the objects of 
mathematics (e.g. triangles, lines, curves, ratio, proportions, numbers, and etc.) are 
ontologically identical.  The single subject matter of all mathematics was geometrical 
extension, and thus, for Descartes, material or extended substance.  Perhaps the single most 
entrenched conception that I am arguing against in my dissertation is the view that for 
Descartes the mathematical objects—particularly numbers—have some sort of ontological 
status that is independent of material extension. It is easier for people to accept that 
geometrical objects such as triangles depend on geometrical extension or reduce to 
extension. But any similar claims about the dependence on extension for numbers or other 
abstract, arithmetic, or algebraic objects doesn’t not seem so acceptable nor plausible.   But I 
argue that the best way to understand Descartes’ views about mathematics is to see that 
Descartes viewed numbers as epistemically and metaphysically dependent on extension.  
In order to elaborate on this account of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics in this 
dissertation, I concentrate on three arguments that speak in favor of understanding the 
truths of mathematics as consisting in the true and immutable nature of extension: the 
metaphysical problems with realism about numbers, the conceptual dependence of numbers 
on extension, and Descartes’ account of the relationship between algebra and geometry.   
The first argument I offer addresses the problem with a long standing and tempting 
alternative account of mathematical objects.  Many commentators have thought that in order 
to account for the necessity, certainty and universal applicability of mathematics, Descartes is 
best understood as having some form of realism about the universals in our mathematical 
cognitions, e.g. geometrical figures such as triangles and numbers such as two.  However I 
argue that these realist readings of Descartes create more problems than they purport to 
solve.  Problems for these realist readings arise because the need to ontologically locate the 
5 
 
universals conflicts with central Cartesian metaphysical doctrines.  The alternative that 
emerges is a nominalism about mathematical objects and truths, and the ultimate nature or 
essence of the ideas named is the nature of extension.  As we have an innate idea of 
extension implanted by God, the necessity, certainty and universal applicability of 
mathematical ideas comes from the true and immutable nature of extension. The nature or 
essence of the mathematical truths reduces to the same metaphysical essence of extended 
substance. 
The second argument I offer addresses the dependence of number or counting on 
extension. There I show that in order for numbers to be conceived at all, a prior idea of 
extension must be contained in the idea.  The conceptual dependence of numbers on 
extension is due to the need to conceive of numeric quantities that rely on a relationship 
between parts and wholes; and the only things that can admit of this conception (divisibility) 
is extension.  Thus, without the idea of the nature of extension, there can be no idea 
numbers. Knowledge of extension is epistemically prior to and necessary for mathematical 
knowledge. 
The final argument I offer is based on Descartes’ unification of algebra and 
geometry.  I show that the best account of Descartes’ mathematics it is given using this way 
of distinguishing the metaphysical and epistemic unity and priority between algebra and 
geometry.  In some sense this argument can also be seen an extension to the one previously 
offered about the part/whole relationships that are necessary to counting.  However, rather 
than talk of part and wholes in our conception of the numeric quantities (multitudes) of 
arithmetic or algebra, Descartes speaks in terms of their dependence on the notion of a unit 
of measure.  It is the necessity of the unit (the parts by which we are measuring or counting 
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wholes) that makes the magnitudes or continuous quantities of pure geometrical extension 
necessary and prior to algebra. 
In general, I have tried to present an account of the metaphysical roots of Descartes’ 
philosophy of mathematics.  This metaphysical root (the first principle, or the simple nature) 
is the nature of extended substance.  And as a clear and certain first principle, its certainty 
and necessity is what accounts for the truths of mathematics, which we can deduce from the 
nature of extension.  There are many more philosophically relevant issues that I have not 
been able to address here due to my own lack of time or expertise, but what I hope that I 
have been able to do is present an interpretation of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics 
that has better accounted for Descartes’ claims about mathematics as well as one that will 
later better fit with his wider conception of the unified system of human knowledge. 
The Broader Project And A Note About The Method 
My arguments for these three points are based on Descartes’ claims about his 
method for philosophizing and the unity of philosophical knowledge—neither of which I 
have the luxury of discussing in any depth at present.  Instead, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, I will very briefly lay out below my understanding of Descartes’ method and the 
unity of philosophical knowledge that I have assumed.  My purpose in providing this rough 
sketch is to give the reader a sense of the interpretative foundations that inform not just this 
discussion of his philosophy of mathematics but the larger project of which the mathematics 
is just one part. 
The unity of science is inextricably tied to Descartes’ new philosophical method of 
investigation he characterized in an unpublished early work, Rules for the Direction of the Mind.1  
                                                
1 I shall use ‘Rules’ to refer to this early work (Regulae Ad Directionem Ingenii), which can be 
found in René Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, 12 vols., revised 
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This unity of science was a significant theme present throughout Descartes’ corpus (as I 
gloss below).  But for Descartes, knowledge consisted in understanding how simpler things 
composed other things, and his method instructs us on how to arrange these component 
parts serially in chains of thought so we can see the interconnections among the composite 
things while reducing them to their most fundamental, simple natures. The discerning and 
ordering of the parts of complexes will explain how, and to what extent, the complexes are 
related.   
To see why this will help us better understand Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics 
we should see how his method for philosophy arises from mathematics in the first place.  
Then all we need to do is turn the method back on the subject (mathematics) that inspired it.  
Thus the whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is 
physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences…2 
Descartes uses the analogy of the tree to represent the interconnectedness of the 
whole of philosophy.  This conception of a unified science can be seen in both in his later 
published work such as the Principles, and also in very early unpublished manuscripts such as 
the Rules. In the Principles, Descartes says that philosophy, or the study of wisdom, must start 
with the search for the first causes or principles in order to attain perfect knowledge of all 
things that mankind is capable of knowing.3  Descartes believes that only two reasons are 
                                                                                                                                            
edition (Paris, 1964-76), X: 359-472 subsequently cited as “AT” followed by volume and 
page number; René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, English translation by J. 
Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1985), I: 9-78—
subsequently cited as “CSM” followed by volume and page number.  For the 3rd volume in 
the series, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: The Correspondence (translated by J. Cottingham, 
R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, & A. Kenny), I cite as “CSMK” followed by page number. 
2 AT IX B: 14; CSM I: 186. 
3 AT IXB: 2; CSM I: 179. 
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necessary to show that “the true principles, enabling one to reach the highest degree of 
wisdom which constitutes the supreme good of human life, are the principles which [he has] 
set down in [The Principles of Philosophy].”4  The first is that his principles are very clear. The 
second is that all other knowledge depends on these principles: they enable all other things 
to be deduced from them.  This scientia or knowledge is the whole of human wisdom, and it 
is unified and interconnected.5  In the Rules, Descartes writes that  
"The sciences as a whole are nothing other than human wisdom, which always 
remains one and the same, however different the subjects to which it is applied, it 
being no more altered by them than sunlight is by the variety of the things it shines 
on.  Hence there is no need to impose any restrictions on our mental powers; for 
the knowledge of one truth does not, like skill in one art, hinder us from 
discovering another; on the contrary, it helps us."6   
He also explains that though the arts of harp-playing and farming are two distinct 
activities requiring distinct skills, and are best mastered when not practiced concurrently, 
science, i.e., human wisdom or knowledge, requires only a single skill: a good reason (bona 
mente), which Descartes otherwise calls "universal wisdom".  Descartes instructs us to direct 
our studies not to particular scholastic problems but instead to the general end and study 
of universal wisdom: we should "consider simply how to increase the natural light of [our] 
reason… in order that [our] intellect should show [our] will what decision it ought to make 
in each of life's contingencies."7  This will be far more effective in our investigation of truth 
                                                
4 AT IXB: 9; CSM I: 183. 
5 See Rule 1; AT X: 359-361; CSM I 9-10. 
6 AT X: 360; CSM I: 9. 
7 AT X:361; CSM I: 110. 
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because all the sciences are closely interconnected and interdependent.  Specializing is thus far 
less effective.   
This systematic and unified body of knowledge based on a set of self-evident first 
principles is contrasted with the specialization of the Scholastics.  Like many philosophers of 
the early modern period, Descartes was so impressed by the success of mathematics that he 
was inspired to adopt as a model for all human inquiry the method of mathematics.  
Descartes observes that there is "hardly any question in the sciences about which clever 
men had not frequently disagreed," and “just arithmetic and geometry" are "free from any 
taint of falsity or uncertainty."8  These two disciplines enjoy the certainty that other 
disciplines lack for they alone concern themselves with an object that is so pure and simple, 
there is no room for doubt or uncertainty.  When Descartes surveys why this is so, he first 
considers the various ways we come by our cognitions: "There are only two ways of arriving 
at a cognition (cognitionem) of things--through experience and through deduction."9   
Whereas our experiences are often deceptive and dubitable, a rational intellect can never 
perform a pure inference or deduction incorrectly.  Crucially, arithmetic and geometry 
arrive at knowledge of their objects through deduction, and hence they make "no 
assumptions that experience might render uncertain."10  The "conclusion we should draw 
from these considerations is … that in seeking the right path (iter) of truth we ought to 
concern ourselves only with objects which admit of as much certainty as the 
                                                
8 Rule 2. AT X: 363-4; CSM I: 11-2. 
9 AT X:364-5; CSM I: 12. 
10 AT X: 365; CSM I: 12. 
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demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry."11 Descartes seeks to develop a scientia 
modeled after arithmetic and geometry. 
The result of first Descartes’ study of arithmetic, and geometry and then a more 
general investigation of mathematics was his method (his universal mathematics)12.13  He 
resolved in his search for the knowledge of things, “to adhere unswervingly to a definite 
order, always starting with the simplest and easiest things and never going beyond them till 
there seems to be nothing further which is worth achieving where they are concerned.”14 
According to Descartes, the contents of our minds can be divided into two types: 
simple natures, and things that are composed of simple natures.15  Simple natures are innate 
ideas16 that we can clearly and distinctly perceive17(or “intuit”, to use Descartes’ term in the 
                                                
11 AT X: 366; CSM I: 12-13. 
12 For discussions about the nature and continuity of Descartes’ method and the mathesis 
universalis, see Alexandrescu (2009); Beck (1952); Dear (1998); Flage and Bonnen (1999); 
Garber (1992), (2000), (2002); Machamer and Maguire (2009); Sasaki (2003); Shuster (1977); 
Smith, K (2010); and Smith, N (2010). 
13 Cf. Rule 4 ( AT X: 371-9; CSM I: 15-20). 
14 Rule 4; AT X: 379; CSM I: 20. 
15 “… it is not possible for us ever to understand anything beyond those simple natures and 
a certain mixture or compounding of one with another.  Indeed, it is often easier to attend at 
once to several mutually conjoined natures than to separate one of them from the others.” 
(Rule 12; AT X: 422; CSM I: 46). 
16 Or as he describes them in the Discourse (AT VI: 41; CSM I: 131) and Principles, the clear 
and certain principles(e.g., AT IXB: 9; CSM I: 183).  See also Nelson (2008). 
17 “… we term ‘simple’ only those things which we know so clearly and distinctly that they 
cannot be divided by the mind into others which are more distinctly known…all the rest we 
conceive to be in a sense composed out of these [simples]” (Rule 12; AT X, 418; CSM I 44). 
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Rules).18  There are not very many of these ideas: Descartes remarks that “there are very few 
pure and simple natures which we can intuit…”19 The different simple natures (or different 
substances, or essences), can form various mixtures or compounds, which can further 
combine to form yet more complex composites.  This compounding of simples in multiple 
iterations and patterns, according to Descartes, can account for all our other more complex 
ideas.20  Given his theory of ideas, “the whole of human knowledge consists uniquely in our achieving a 
distinct perception of how all these simple natures contribute to the composition of other things.”21 His entire 
method, as he conceived it, consists in ordering and arranging our ideas according to their degree of 
confusion or complexity.22 
                                                
18 “... we need take no great pains to discover these simple natures, because they are self 
evident enough.  What requires effort is distinguishing one from another, and intuiting each 
one separately with steadfast mental gaze.”  (Rule 12; AT X: 425; CSM I: 48).    
And also: 
 “…we should note that there are very few pure and simple natures which we can intuit 
straight off and per se (independently of any others) either in our sensory experience or by 
means of a light innate within us.  We should, as I said, attend carefully to the simple natures 
which can be intuited in this way, for these are the ones which in each series we term simple 
in the highest degree. (Rule 6; AT X: 383; CSM I: 22). 
19 Rule 6; AT X: 383; CSM I: 22. 
20 “… it is not possible for us ever to understand anything beyond those simple natures and 
a certain mixture or compounding of one with another.  Indeed, it is often easier to attend at 
once to several mutually conjoined natures than to separate one of them from the others.” 
(Rule 12; AT X: 422; CSM I: 46). 
21 Rule 12; AT X: 427; CSM: 49. Emphasis mine. 
22 “The whole method consists entirely in the ordering and arranging of the objects of which 
we must concentrate our mind’s eye if we are to discover some truth.  We shall be following 
this method exactly if we first reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step to 
simpler ones, and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest ones of all, try to ascend 
through the same steps to a knowledge of all the rest.”  (Rule 5; AT X: 379; CSM I: 20). 
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In this fashion, Descartes’ universal mathematics, as given in the Rules is not so much 
a method for mere mathematical computation, but a method for all the sciences.  Descartes 
thinks that mathematics has something important to offer us23 due to its focus on order and 
patterns.24   What Descartes finds valuable about the study of mathematics is the training of 
our minds in his method, which we can then use for proper scientific enquiry that yields 
knowledge of the true nature of things.25  All human knowledge would consist in 
understanding the necessary order of dependence (or their composition) in terms of the few 
and most simple natures, which are the metaphysical roots on his tree of knowledge.  The 
unity of human knowledge lies in the reduction of all things to the simple natures.    
At present, though, I only argue that all that we consider mathematical reduces to the 
nature of extension:  it is the nature of extension that unifies algebra and geometry, but the 
                                                
23 Though he can otherwise at times be surprisingly disparaging of just doing mathematics, 
for example, Descartes writes in the Rules that he “would not value these Rules so highly if 
they were good only for solving those pointless problems with which arithmeticians and 
geometers are inclined to while away their time, for in that case, all I could credit myself with 
achieving would be to dabble in trifles with greater subtlety than they.” Rule 4; AT X: 374; 
CSM I: 18.   
And that, “there is really nothing more futile than so busying ourselves with bare numbers 
and imaginary figures that we seem to rest content in the knowledge of such trifles. Rule 4; 
AT X: 374; CSM I: 18. 
24 “Number-games and any games involving arithmetic, and the like, belong [in the simplest 
and least exalted arts].  It is surprising how much all these activities exercise our minds, 
provided of course we discover them for ourselves and not from others.  For, since nothing 
in these activities remains hidden and they are totally adapted to human cognitive capacities, 
they present us in the most distinct way with innumerable instances of order, each one 
different from the other, yet all regular.  Human discernment consists almost entirely in the 
proper observance of such order.”  Rule 10; AT X: 404; CSM I: 35. 
25 “… these Rules are so useful in the pursuit of deeper wisdom that I have no hesitation in 
saying that this part of our method was designed not just for the sake of mathematical 
problems; our intention was, rather, that the mathematical problems should be studied 
almost exclusively for the sake of the excellent practice which they give us in the method.” 
Rule 14; AT X: 442; CSM I: 59. 
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nature of extension is also necessary for our mathematical ideas.  This interpretation has 
several virtues.  It avoids the metaphysical problems of competing accounts.  It accounts for 
a larger set of texts than the alternative interpretations.  It can better account for Descartes’ 
mathematical practices.  And it can unify his early works with his later works.  My hope is 
that the virtues of the resulting account of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics will render 
the underlying interpretive assumptions about Descartes’ method and the unity of 
knowledge that I have employed worthy of discussion as an interpretation for Descartes’ 
philosophical corpus more generally. 
 
   
 
Chapter 2:  Universals  and Descartes’  metaphysics of  numbers 
0. The Metaphysics Of Mathematical Objects 
Eugene Wigner begins his famous 1960 publication26 with a story about former high-
school classmates: 
One of them became a statistician and was working on population trends.  He 
showed a reprint to his former classmate.  The reprint started, as usual, with the 
Gaussian distribution and the statistician explained to this former classmate the 
meaning of the symbols for the actual population, for the average population, and 
so on.  His classmate was a bit incredulous and was not quite sure whether the 
statistician was pulling his leg.  “How do you know that?” was his query. “And 
what is this symbol here?” “Oh said the statistician, “this is pi” “What is that?” 
“The ratio of the circumference of the circle to its diameter.” “Well, now you are 
pushing your joke too far,” said the classmate, “surely the population has nothing 
to do with the circumference of the circle.” 
Examples like the one in Wigner’s story are legion.  As Wigner’s title (The 
Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences) aptly observes, the applicability of 
mathematics is surprising, uncanny and inexplicable.  A particularly striking feature of 
mathematics is the universality of its application in various and sundry particular instances.  
Consider a mathematical notion such as the irrational number we refer to with ‘pi’.  Used to 
express the ratio of a circle’s circumference and its diameter, this number holds for all 
circles, any circle with any diameter. It can also be used to express a third geometric 
magnitude: that of a line constructed from the circle’s circumference and diameter. 
                                                
26 “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences” in Commutations 
in Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 13, No. 1 (February 1960). New York: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc.  
15 
 
Moreover, this number is also used in expressing probability distributions for things like 
populations.  The mathematical notion of this irrational (or transcendental) number does not 
resemble a ratio of two geometric magnitudes any more than it does a line or population 
distribution.  Nor, for that matter, does the comparison between a diameter and 
circumference seem to resemble population distributions.   
In a philosophy of mathematics some explanation is required for such striking 
universality of mathematical notions.  What explains the possibility of Thales’ pioneering 
practice of formulating properties of geometrical figures as general statements?  What 
explains the systematic deducibility of these properties in the form of geometric propositions 
as Euclid did in his Elements? What explains the number-theoretic investigation of the 
properties of numbers by the Pythagoreans,27 or the seeming necessity and universality of 
‘5+7=12’? Accounts of mathematics generally fall into one of two categories: realist accounts 
or anti-realist accounts.  My use of ‘realism’28 here aims to cover the type of views in which 
“mathematical objects” have some sort of independence from all the particular cases to 
which they apply while remaining silent about whether mathematical objects are properties, 
relations, propositions, concepts, or forms. The truths about these mathematical objects are 
prior to any particular in the sense that they are independent and underived.  Thus, a 
hallmark of these types of realist views is that all of the mathematical objects will be abstract.  
This indeterminacy allows mathematical objects to apply in a wide variety of particular 
instances.  This indeterminacy also makes mathematical objects independent of particular 
                                                
27 For more, see Heath (1981).  
28 The term ‘realism’ has come to cover a variety of accounts in the philosophy of 
mathematics and can apply to positions ranging from the ontology of mathematical objects 
to the truth of mathematical propositions.  It is certainly not my intention to trample the 
delicate taxonomy of positions offered in contemporary philosophy of mathematics.  
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occurrences of them in the world, e.g., even if nothing in the world were circular, truths 
about circles or the concept of circle would not change.  “Anti-realism” is used to describe 
views in which abstract, independent mathematical objects do not exist.  Note that the focus 
of anti-realism is the denial of the prior existence of something that is abstract and 
independent of any particular instance that can be said to exhibit or instantiate the object. 
A common view of Rationalists and Empiricists of the early modern period divides 
them neatly along party lines into realists and anti-realists, respectively.29  Rationalists were so 
impressed by the certainty and aprioricity of mathematics that they accepted the existence of 
universals and sought to emulate the method of mathematics.  They even went so far as to 
provide axioms and demonstrate from philosophical first principles all of human 
knowledge.30  Because Empiricists believed instead that humanity could not reach the 
Platonic heavens, they sought to explain how it was that mathematics could appear necessary 
and apply universally without actually appealing to our cognitive grasp of universals.31  
There is a long tradition of commentators who favor reading Descartes, the father of 
modern day rationalism, as a mathematical realist32.  Several passages seem to make 
inevitable some interpretation of Descartes as a realist.  Traditional commentators think that 
these texts recommend that Descartes was a realist about universals generally, though I will 
                                                
29 Shapiro (2005) p.1-8. 
30 Descartes’ Rules, Spinoza’s Ethics, Malebranche’s Search for Truth. 
31 See Parsons (1983) Essay 1. 
32 For reasons that well become clear below, what I am calling a realist reading includes 
accounts that have been presented as an alternative to realism (e.g. conceptualism, or 
nominalism). 
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focus on numbers in particular for present purposes. 33  I argue that these tricky interpretive 
issues are not best resolved by a realist understanding of Descartes because doing so creates 
problems for understanding his philosophy of mathematics and general metaphysics that are 
more severe than the difficulties they purport to solve.  In short, we should resist a realist 
reading of Descartes and seek an alternative. 
Given the problems of realist accounts, I argue that Descartes is best understood as 
an anti-realist.  More specifically, Descartes has a nominalist account of universals that is 
similar to accounts typically ascribed to Empiricists such as Berkeley or Hume.  A reading of 
Descartes as a mathematical nominalist is not necessarily free from all of the worries typical 
of nominalism, but it is a reading that will be free from the interpretive problems of realist 
accounts.  
But the nominalist account of universals for Descartes that I offer is also 
significantly different from the accounts in Berkeley and Hume, despite having some 
similarities.  Numbers and geometrical figures are names of ideas, but to Descartes they are 
ultimately ideas of extension or of the nature of extension.  The nature of extension grounds 
the necessity and apriority of what we call the mathematical truths.  For Descartes, number-
ideas depend on extension. This dependence can be understood metaphysically or 
epistemically.  Strictly speaking, the things that are numbered are metaphysically identical to 
extension.  However, epistemologically, ideas of number must conceptually contain34 ideas 
                                                
33 Unless otherwise noted, for the remainder of this dissertation my discussion of universals 
is limited to only those that Descartes discusses the most: the mathematical objects—by 
which I mean to refer both to geometrical figures (e.g. triangles) and to arithmetical quantities and 
numbers (e.g. two or twoness). 
34 Cf. definition 9 from the geometrical proofs in Second Replies (AT VII: 162; CSM II: 
114): When we say that something is contained in the nature or concept  o f  a thing , this is 
the same as saying that it is true of that thing, or that it can be asserted of that thing. 
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of extension.  This is to say that numeric thinking depends on conceptually prior ideas of 
extension such that if the requisite idea of extension were lacking, an idea of number could 
never occur. 
In what follows, I survey three types of accounts of Cartesian mathematical objects.  
I divide these accounts into two camps. The first camp attributes to Descartes what I call a 
“strong realism” (SR) about mathematical objects.  I examine two types of SR: one found in 
Anthony Kenny and the other in Tad Schmaltz.  The second camp attributes a “weak 
realism” (WR) to Descartes; WR was developed to avoid the problems arising from a SR 
reading of Descartes.  Proponents of WR views have presented their interpretations as 
attributing to Descartes a “conceptualism” about numbers.  More importantly for my 
present purposes, proponents of WR interpretations have presented their accounts as an 
alternative to resorting to “realism” and thereby avoiding all of the problems associated with 
reading Descartes as a realist.  However, some rather serious problems for these 
conceptualist readings have gone unnoticed as yet.  These problems can be traced to a 
shared motivation for realism among conceptualist readings. Thus, I am intentionally 
labeling these interpretations “Weak Realism” in an effort to emphasize their similar realist 
motivations. 
All three interpretations offer an account of how Descartes thought about 
mathematical objects, but they disagree substantially about the ontological status of 
mathematical objects.  As such, the particular problems arising for each account also differ 
across accounts.  Even so, for all three interpretations it is the realism invoked on Descartes’ 
behalf that is philosophically and interpretively problematic.  The exploration of the 
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problems nonetheless suggests a promising alternative: that numbers depend on extension. I 
argue that this view avoids the problems of the realist interpretations by not running afoul of 
basic Cartesian tenets.  
1. Three Central Cartesian Doctrines. 
There are three fundamental doctrines of Cartesian metaphysics that any 
interpretation seeks to preserve.  In general, no interpretation of Descartes ought to run 
afoul of these core positions, or at least not do so without good cause or explanation.  
Before we proceed further to examine and evaluate the various interpretations that have 
been offered, it would be expedient to briefly review these three central claims. 
 
(1). The perfection of God 
Descartes’ God is infinitely perfect and must have all of the perfections.35  Simplicity is a 
perfection; thus, God has divine simplicity.36  While we sometimes speak as though God 
wills and understands, Descartes warns that we ought not think that God has distinct 
faculties; rather, “there is always a single identical and perfectly simple act by means of which 
he simultaneously understands, wills and accomplishes everything."37  Necessary existence is 
                                                
35 “The substance which we understand to be supremely perfect, and in which we conceive 
absolutely nothing that implies any defect or limitations in that perfections, is called God.” 
AT VII:162; CSM II:114; emphasis original. 
36 “On the contrary, the unity, the simplicity, or the inseparability of all the attributes of God 
is one of the most important of all the perfections which I understand him to have.” AT 
VII: 50; CSM II: 34. 
37 Principles I: 23; AT VIIIA: 14; CSM I: 201. 
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also a perfection that belongs to God38; that is, God is self-caused and cannot depend on 
anything else for His existence. 
 
(2). Cartesian Dualism 
Of the things that God created, they can be divided into only two types: mind or body.  
Descartes writes in the Principles:  
But I recognize only two ultimate classes of things: first, intellectual or thinking 
things, i.e. those which pertain to mind or thinking substance; and secondly, 
material things, i.e. those which pertain to extended substance or body.39 
 
(3). Real Distinction between substances 
Any two different substances must be really distinct from one another. 40  This distinctness 
means that God, mind, and body are metaphysically distinct: one is never numerically 
identical with any of the others. 
 
With these in hand, let us now turn to the various realist interpretations of Descartes 
that have been offered. 
2. Realism In Cartesian Mathematics 
Many difficulties surround Descartes’ account of the nature and status of 
mathematical objects. These difficulties leave much room for interpretation, as is evidenced 
by the wide range of available accounts in the literature.  I claim that while scholars have 
                                                
38 Principles I : 14; AT VIIIA: 10; CSM I: 197-8.  
39 Principles I: 48; AT VIIIA: 23; CSM I: 208. 
40 Principles I: 60; AT VIIIA: 28-9; CSM I: 213. 
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mostly appealed to a realism in some form or another to resolve these difficulties, their 
accounts differ in other significant ways.  For many scholars, a major point of tension stems 
from apparent conflicts between accounts of mathematical objects, especially Descartes’ 
discussion of true and immutable natures in the Meditations as compared to his discussion of 
universals in the Principles. 
In the Principles, Descartes speaks of numbers and geometrical figures such as 
triangles as “modes of thinking” and not as objects that have some separate, real, mind-
independent existence of their own. Here, the universals seem to be mere ideas or modes of 
our mind.  E.g., in the Principles I: 58, Descartes writes that, “Number and all universals are 
simply modes of thinking.”41  Earlier, in the Principles I: 55, he explains that we should not 
regard number as “anything separate from the things which are ordered and numbered, but 
should think of them simply as modes under which we consider the things in question.”42  
In contrast, Descartes writes in the Fifth Meditations that, “there is still a 
determinate nature, or essence, or form of the triangle which is immutable and eternal, and 
not invented by me or dependent on my mind.”43  This passage seems to suggest that while 
geometrical objects (and presumably other mathematical objects like numbers) may be 
conceived of by our minds, they also have some independent existence of their own.     
To further complicate matters, mathematical truths and the true immutable natures 
or essences of the Fifth Meditations are also connected to Descartes’ doctrine of the eternal 
truths.  For example, in a letter to Mersenne dated April 15, 1630, Descartes writes, “The 
                                                
41 AT VIII A: 27; CSM I: 212. 
42 AT VIII A: 26; CSM I: 211. 
43 AT VII: 64; CSM II: 45. 
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mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and depend on him 
entirely no less than the rest of his creatures.”44  About a month later in another letter to 
Mersenne, Descartes writes that the essence of created things, “is nothing more than the 
eternal truths.”45  By connecting mathematical truths and the true, immutable and eternal 
nature of geometrical objects, a connection can be made from mathematical objects to the 
eternal truths.  This connection also serves to further encourage a reading of Descartes that 
allows for a realism about abstract mathematical objects.  Such readings stress the existing, 
immutable nature of the mathematical objects.  The objects’ nature is independent of the 
way we think of them, which ascribes these readings to the existence of mind-independent 
real mathematical objects in some form or another.  I call this reading a strong realism.  On 
the other hand, weak realism will focus more on the passages from the Principles and not 
adopt the same mind-independent desiderata. 
I will present the various realist interpretations in terms of how they locate the 
universal.  As opposed to merely differentiating the interpretations in terms of the text they 
emphasize the most, this presentation will allow us to get a better grasp on the differences 
between what I call a strong realism and a weak realism.   
Recall that any realist reading supports the existence of abstract non-particulars that 
are independent of the things that contain, exhibit or exemplify them.  According to 
Cartesian ontology there are three substances: God (i.e. infinite substance), mind (i.e. 
thinking substance) and body (i.e. extended substance).  If a universal is real, that is, if it 
                                                
44 AT I: 145; CSMK: 23. 
45 AT I: 152; CSMK: 25. 
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exists, it will need to be located somewhere in ontological space.  Thus, every realist account 
faces a trilema for which there are broadly three possibilities. 
Mathematical objects must be located either: 
(i) in God, 
(ii) in one of the created substances, mind or body, 
(iii) in some third realm. 
The “strength” of the realism in SR readings stems from the elimination of (ii).  The SR-
universals have a much more robust existence than WR-universals. WR accounts will 
attempt to locate the universal in the created mind (ii)—exactly what a SR account rules out. 
However, I show below that this need to locate the abstract universal in any realist 
accounts will ultimately be problematic. 
2.1 Strong Realism 
As I mentioned above, SR interpretations are primarily motivated by two sets of 
passages in Descartes writings: the passages from the Meditations and those from the 
correspondence.  SR accounts stress two ideas from these passages.  First, SR readings call 
attention to the independence of mathematical objects from the world and from our human 
minds. Second, SR readings underscore the emphasis this world- and mind-independence 
then places on the existence of the nature of the mathematical object.  For example, in 
addition to what we saw above, Descartes also writes in the Fifth Meditation: 
When, for example, I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps no such figure exists, or 
has ever existed, anywhere outside my thought, there is still a determinate nature, 
or essence, or form of the triangle which is immutable and eternal, and not invented 
by me or dependent on my mind.  This is clear from the fact that various properties can 
be demonstrated of the triangle, for example, that its three angles equal two right 
angles, that its greatest side subtends its greatest angle, and the like; and since these 
properties are ones which I now clearly recognize whether I want to or not, even if 
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I never thought of them at all when I previously imagined the triangle, it follows 
that they cannot have been invented by me.46 
A bit later, he writes: 
It is not necessary for me to imagine any triangle; but whenever I choose to 
consider a rectilinear figure that has just three angles, I must ascribe to it properties 
from which it is rightly inferred that its three angles are not greater than two right 
angles, even if I do not notice this at the time…47 
Both Anthony Kenny and Tad Schmaltz appeal to passages like the ones above to 
support the view that Descartes’ mathematical objects cannot be identified with created 
mind or body existing in the actual world.  That is, they appeal to the two passages above to 
rule out (ii).    
Universals do not depend on the thoughts of finite minds, as evidenced by our 
inability to manipulate or alter the natures of universals at will.   
Nor do they depend on the existence of material things; for the nature of the triangle 
is unaffected by whether or not any actual triangles exist.  In fact, as Kenny notes, “the 
supposition that no triangles exist in the world is not merely a part of Descartes’ hyperbolical 
doubt.  He believes the supposition to be true of the macroscopic world even after he 
provides the solution to his methodic doubts”48.  
Kenny and Schmaltz part ways in their SR according to how each interpretation 
treats Descartes’ writings on the eternal truths.  After ruling out option (ii), two possibilities 
remain open.  Kenny and Schmaltz each locate universals in a different place.  Kenny opts to 
locate universals in some third realm (iii), while Schmaltz locates them in God (i).  
                                                
46 AT VII: 64; CSM II: 44-45. 
47 AT VII: 67-68; CSM II: 47. 
48 Kenny (1958) 148-149. 
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Kenny describes Descartes as “the founder of modern Platonism”49 and thinks “for 
Descartes the geometer’s triangle is an eternal creature of God, with its own immutable nature 
and properties, a real thing lacking only the perfection of actual existence.”50  Kenny thinks 
that regardless of “whether [a geometrical figure] existed or not, it had a kind of being that 
was sufficient to distinguish it from nothing, and it had its eternal immutable essence.”51 
Kenny’s understanding of mathematical objects as eternal creatures of God is 
motivated largely by his understanding of Descartes’ doctrine of the eternal truths.  For 
Kenny, these mathematical entities have essences of their own that are distinct from God’s 
essence, and they “stand in a causal relationship to Him”52 as things created by God.  This 
relationship must be the case; otherwise, as Gassendi points out, “it seems very hard to 
propose that there is any ‘immutable and eternal nature’ apart from almighty God.”53  And 
indeed, Descartes is clear that  
“The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and 
depend on him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures.  Indeed to say that 
these truths are independent of God is to talk of him as if he were Jupiter or Saturn 
and to subject him to the Styx and the Fates.”54  
Descartes also tells Gassendi that the immutable essences and eternal truths “are 
themselves immutable and eternal, because God so willed, because he so arranged”55 
                                                
49 Kenny (1970) 692-693. 
50 Kenny (1970) 697, emphasis mine. 
51 Kenny (1970) 699. 
52 Kenny (1970) 696. 
53 AT VII:219; CSM II: 221. 
54 AT I: 145; CSMK: 23. 
55 AT VII: 380; CSM II: 261. 
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Furthermore, Descartes writes in the Sixth Replies that the eternal truths depend “on God 
alone, who as supreme legislator, has instituted them from eternity”56. Thus, Kenny 
understands Descartes’ immutable essences or natures as akin to the eternal truths: eternal 
substances that are distinct from God. 
Kenny’s account has its strengths.  Kenny’s interpretation of Descartes also accounts 
for Descartes’ emphasis on the independence of mathematical objects from the physical 
extended world and from our minds.  But despite its strengths, Kenny’s account is not 
without its problems. 
Kenny’s Descartes endorses the following two things about mathematical objects.  
First, for Kenny’s Descartes, mathematical objects are distinct, non-identical to and 
independent of both human minds and the actual physical world.  Second, on Kenny’s 
account, these mathematical objects have some form of existence and are creatures distinct 
from God, for they are under the control of God’s will.   
But by endorsing both of these claims, Kenny is presented with a problem for his 
interpretation when he has to locate these universals. To which class of created entities does 
these mathematical objects and truths belong? It is already clear on Kenny’s account that as a 
creature of God, mathematical objects are distinct from and not identical to God.  However, 
Kenny’s interpretation of mathematical objects is that they are independent and distinct in 
nature and essence of both minds and bodies. Thus, his interpretation of mathematical 
objects seems to require some sort of third realm or type of existence.57  Such a third realm 
                                                
56 AT VII: 436; CSM II: 294. 
57 In addition to strong suggestions to this effect made by Kenny himself when he compares 
the existence of Cartesian mathematical objects to a Meinongian subsistence (c.f. Kenny 
(1968) 155-156). 
27 
 
of creatures would conflict with Descartes’ dualism stated in the Principles58 in which he 
claims that created things fall into only two kinds: minds or bodies.  
As an SR interpretation, Schmaltz’s reading locates the true and immutable natures 
outside both human minds and material extension.  But Schmaltz does not go the way of 
Kenny’s Platonic forms.  Instead Schmaltz understands these mathematical objects (i.e. 
eternal truths, natures, or essences) as divine ideas or volitions.59  As Schmaltz himself notes:  
Whereas Kenny took [the doctrine of divine creation of the eternal truths] to reveal 
that Descartes identifies immutable essences with eternal substances distinct from 
God, I hold instead that it shows that [Descartes] identifies immutable essences 
with God himself, or more precisely, with laws that are not distinct from divine 
decrees.60 
For Schmaltz, Kenny and others were misled by the comparison of eternal truths to 
other creatures, which seems to suggest that Descartes thinks the eternal truths are 
themselves creatures. However, Schmaltz argues, “despite the appearance, Descartes holds 
that these truths are not really distinct from God.”61  The mathematical objects are just like 
the eternal truths that God creates by his divine decree, which Schmaltz locates in God as 
part of his divine volition.  Numbers and geometrical figures on this view are only rationally62, 
not really, distinct from God, preserving the dualism of created things. 
                                                
58 Principles1: 48; AT VIIIA: 23; CSM I: 208. 
59 While this understanding means that mathematical objects are not independent from the 
mind of God, for my purposes mathematical objects’ independence of human minds makes 
Schmaltz’s interpretation fall in the SR category. 
60 Schmaltz (1991) 135. 
61 Schmaltz (1991) 145. 
62 A rational distinction is one that is made merely in our mind by our reason.  But things 
that are merely rationally distinct are still metaphysically, numerically identical, and not in 
reality distinct. 
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Although placing mathematical essences and truths in God allows Schmaltz to 
escape Kenny’s problems, Schmaltz runs into serious problems of his own as a result.  
Descartes’ commitment to divine perfection is the source of two such problems.   
First, it is unclear how to understand these truths as not also necessary in the same 
way that Descartes’ God is necessary if the truths are identified with God himself.  Recall in 
a letter to Mersenne from above that Descartes claims God was free to not create these 
truths.  So if God is simple, and these truths are identical with God, and the essence of God 
is that he has necessary existence (which presumably applies to his entire simple self) why are 
the eternal truths not also necessary to God? Yet according to Descartes, like all other 
created things the eternal truths are “no more necessarily attached to His essence than other 
created things.”63   
The second problem for Schmaltz’s interpretation is the resulting view that while 
these truths are supposed to be identical to God, God is also their efficient cause. In the 
sixth set of replies Descartes writes that:  
There is no need to ask what category of causality is applicable to the dependence 
of this goodness upon God, or to the dependence on him of other truths, both 
mathematical and metaphysical.  For since the various kinds of causality were 
enumerated by thinkers who did not, perhaps, attend to this type of causality, it is 
hardly surprising that they gave no name to it.  But in fact they did give it a name, 
for it can be called efficient causality…64  
This passage is problematic for Schmaltz’s reading because Descartes thinks that God is not 
his own efficient cause.65  Thus, on this reading we are claiming that God is both his own 
                                                
63 AT I: 151-154; CSMK 25-26. 
64 AT VII: 436; CSM II: 294. 
65 “There is no need to say that God is the efficient cause of himself, for this might give rise 
to a verbal dispute.” AT VII:110-111; CSM II: 80. 
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efficient cause and not his own efficient cause.  Schmaltz’s realistic reading of Descartes 
fares no better than Kenny’s. 
While there are other versions of SR accounts of Descartes’ mathematical objects, 
such views66 all suffer from some version of the problems confronting Kenny and Schmaltz.  
This is because they all face the same trilemma: Either mathematical objects are located (i) in 
God, (ii) in the material world or in the mind as ideas, or (iii) in some third type of existence.  
SR accounts see Meditation 5 as ruling out (ii), which motivates a SR strategy in the first 
place.  Thus, any other SR account will be, like Kenny and Schmaltz, left with only two 
options: (i) and (iii).  As we have seen, these options are deeply problematic.  
Our discussion of Kenny’s Platonic version of a SR-account revealed that 
mathematical objects can’t have their own third type of existence, like Platonic forms in their 
own realm, lest we give up Cartesian dualism.  And our discussion of Schmaltz’s SR-account 
revealed that mathematical objects cannot be in or identical to God lest we give up divine 
perfection.  What hasn’t yet been explored is the possibility the SR accounts ignored: option 
(ii).  This option then leaves us with only two possibilities: the two created natures.  Either 
numbers and other mathematical objects are or exist in bodies or they are or exist in minds.  
This option is what WR-accounts of Descartes’ mathematical objects consider. 
2.2 Weak Realism  
SR-accounts place much of their emphasis on the texts coming from the Meditations 
about true immutable natures and less emphasis on the passages found in the Principles on 
the nature of universals. However, there are other views that do the opposite.  These views 
                                                
66 Marleen Rozemond (1998) has an account that is not too different from Schmaltz’s.  
Rather than locating the mathematical objects in God in the form of his divine volitions, 
Rozemond locates them in God’s intellect.   
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attempt to account for the Meditations while putting more emphasis on the conceptualism of 
the Principles.  Because such views read Cartesian universals as abstract concepts, they have 
been traditionally labeled “conceptualist” views and have often been presented as an 
alternative to realism.67  But, as I argue below, the conceptualist views still require 
mathematical objects to be prior in a way that entails a weak realism.  WR-style views have 
been suggested or foreshadowed by commentators such as Martial Gueroult68, Alan 
Gewirth69, Lawrence Nolan70, and Vere Chappell71.  As Nolan has the most developed72 
account, I will use his account as the representative for WR accounts in general.   
Nolan rejects the idea that universals like numbers or triangles exist in extended 
things, especially based on passages from the Principles. He takes very seriously Descartes’ 
claims about numbers and universals being thoughts or ideas in our minds—even innate 
ideas73. On such an account numbers and other universals are concepts in our minds. 
According to Nolan these innate ideas should be thought of as dispositions that need to be 
                                                
67 For example, see the discussion in Miller (1950).  Also see Nolan (1998) and Chappell 
(1997)—both being anti-realist, conceptualist. 
68 See Gueroult (1968). 
69 See Gewirth (1970) and (1971). 
70 Nolan (1997a), (1997b) and (1998). 
71 Nolan (1998). 
72 Nolan’s account of universals as concepts is a corollary to his account of Descartes’ theory 
of attributes and is supposed to come apiece with his account of Cartesian natures.  See 
Nolan (1997a), (1997b) and (1998). 
73 Cf. Nolan (1998) and Nolan (1997) 183, and ft. 15 on page 189-191. 
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awakened in our thought by the process of intellectual abstraction when occasioned.74 The 
abstractive process effects the discovery of an innate idea, not the creation of the idea.75 
Before describing Nolan’s WR interpretation more fully, let me first emphasize how 
attractive this view is.  WR can account for passages such as those in the Fifth Mediation 
that motivate others to go towards the problematic SR views. WR can account for the 
objectivity and immutability76 of mathematical natures by making them fixed innate ideas in 
our minds, placed there by God. However, WR avoids those problems of SR by 
understanding texts such as those in the Fifth Meditation as claiming that mathematical 
natures are not subject to our will.  Our minds are not inventing the ideas or natures of 
triangles or other mathematical objects; instead, we are thinking of a nature that isn’t created 
                                                
74 Nolan (1998). 
75 “Like many figures of the modern period, Descartes conceives abstraction in terms of 
selective attention.  One difference between his conception and the view traditionally 
associated with Locke is that, in this case at least, we are not abstracting to a new more 
general idea; rather we are selectively attending to different aspects of a single idea.” Nolan 
(1998) 167. 
76 For example see Nolan ( 1997a) 183, or Chappell (1997) 125:  
What I now wish to claim is that, for Descartes, God’s creation of numbers and 
figures consists in his creation of minds containing the ideas of numbers and 
figures.  Mathematical objects just are ideas according to the ontology of the 
Principles; according to the doctrine of innate ideas, God creates them by including 
them within the minds that are the direct products of his creating action.  These 
ideas need not be consciously present to the minds in which they are housed, either 
from the beginning or at every moment thereafter.  They may exist originally or 
intermittently as unconscious dispositions, as Descartes acknowledges in his 
Comments on Regius’s Programma (VIIB.357f.,361).  But doesn’t this position destroy 
the objectivity of mathematics by making its objects differ from mind to mind?  
And doesn’t it render these objects mutable, since minds grow and wither and the 
ideas within them change?  No, for Descartes holds that God installs the same 
ideas in every mind that he creates; and no again, since the ideas that God makes to 
be innate in us are constant and never change.  So the position I am attributing to 
Descartes secures both the objectivity and the immutability of mathematical 
objects.  
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by the mind.  The nature is immutable, since we cannot change it, for it has been fixed in our 
mind by God.  Furthermore, in creating us with these innate ideas, God can also be said to 
create these truths, and these truths depend on God just as any of his other creatures depend 
on him. 
Thus, WR asserts a weak realism.  The realism of the universal is not one that posits 
some mysterious universal out there in the world but relies instead on the reality of the 
concept in our minds. There is a universal; it is an abstract general idea or concept in our 
minds.  This concept is supposed to be fully general and not at all particular, which makes 
this concept a real universal in the weak sense.  This is how the idea of twoness in general can 
apply to all the (not innate) instances of things occurring in twos.  
The machinery for Nolan’s interpretation can be partially found in the Third 
Meditation.  As Nolan reads it, innate ideas are ideas whose content is not determined by our 
will.77 We cannot change the content or nature of innate ideas. Nolan also uses the 
distinction between formal and objective reality in the Third Meditation78. The formal reality 
of an idea is idea qua mode of the mind (or the idea insofar as it is a piece of mental stuff). 
In this sense, all of our ideas are mere modes of the mind. However, an idea’s objective reality 
is determined by what sort of thing the idea represents.  For example, the objective reality of 
a particular mode of my mind, say an idea of God, is God.  However, for Nolan the 
objective reality of my idea of an idea of God is not God but instead an idea. Nolan uses this 
                                                
77 Nolan (1997a) 178-181. 
78 AT VII: 40-41; CSM II:28-9. 
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to explain how we can have WR for universals.  Ultimately for Nolan the “Cartesian 
universals are ideas taken objectively”79.   
Nolan uses this distinction to provide an account of how we can go step by step to a 
WR about universals. Let me fill out Nolan’s discussion of Principles 1:59 (Descartes’ example 
of the two stones).80 
We start with the idea of a pair of stones. On Nolan’s account the idea has a formal 
reality: it is a mode of my mind. The objective reality of this idea is that of the stones.  Next, 
Nolan appeals to the “process of abstraction,” where we can “focus on certain aspects of 
that idea [of the pair of stones] while ignoring – but not excluding—other aspects.”81  Doing 
so will allow us to distinguish the stones from their number in our thought: we just focus 
“exclusively on their twoness and ignore their extension, duration, existence, etc. But the 
distinction between the two stones and their twoness is confined to our thought; in reality, 
there is no such distinction.”82 At this point we have a different mode of thought, where the 
objective reality of this new thought is not that of the stones but is that of the idea of the 
twoness of the stones.   
Then, Nolan goes on to explain, we can again abstract from this particular idea of 
the twoness of the stones (or from other ideas of twoness, like the idea of the twoness of 
                                                
79 Nolan (1998) 173, emphasis mine. 
80 Nolan (1998) 173-175. 
81 Nolan (1998) 174. 
82 Nolan (1998) 174. 
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two birds, or of two trees) to an even more abstract idea of twoness in general.83  This new level 
of abstraction presumably also is a different mode of thought, the idea of twoness in general, 
as opposed to the twoness of the stones, which we have abstracted out. 
Now, from other things, such as birds, trees or fish, we can abstract to the ideas of 
the twoness of the birds, the twoness of the trees, and the twoness of the fish. And then 
once more, we can abstract away the birds, trees or fish from the twoness of the birds, the 
trees and the fish so that we have just an idea of twoness. Nolan explains, “this requires a 
further level of abstraction because we are no longer attending to the particular substances 
(i.e. the stones, the birds, or the trees), as we were in at the first level.”84    
To review:   
At Level 1, we have an idea of a bird, and another bird.   
Then at Level 2, we have an idea of the twoness of the birds.   
Finally at Level 3, we have an idea of the idea of twoness in general: the universal—
and its all to this numerically identical universal that we arrive each time.  Regardless of what 
we started with at level 1 (it could be and idea of a bird and another bird, a tree and another 
tree, a fish and another fish, etc.) in the end, we arrive at the same universal, innate concept 
of twoness. 
Though Nolan uses extended objects in his example of the abstraction that allows 
for an idea of the universal, Nolan’s Descartes is not committed to the view that the 
necessary abstraction to occasion the innate idea could not come from non-extended things 
                                                
83 “First, after producing a number of rational distinctions concerning the twoness of various 
substances—e.g. the twoness of the stones, the twoness of the birds, the twoness of the 
trees, etc.—we can abstract one further level to twoness in general.” Nolan (1998) 174. 
84 Nolan (1998) 174-175. 
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as well.  According to Nolan, we can “arrive at universal twoness simply by iterating 
abstractions from a single instance.  We can move directly from the twoness of the two 
stones to twoness in general simply by abstracting the stones.”85  But now it seems that we 
could also arrive at universal twoness simply by iterating abstractions from a single instance 
when we move directly from the twoness of two ideas, for example, to twoness in general 
simply by abstracting the particular ideas being counted.   
The main purpose of the abstractive process for Nolan’s conceptualist reading serves 
to bridge the move from particulars to universals, and to explain how the universals are 
innate—despite the fact that the particular instances where the universals apply are not 
innate.  To this end, the conceptualist account opens up the abstractive process: it can 
originate from both extended and non-extended objects. 
As for passages in which Descartes asserts that number is not “separate from the 
things which are ordered and numbered,”86 Nolan appeals to his account of rational 
distinctions as the way Descartes abstracts (or selectively directs his attention).  Here, again, 
an illustration would be helpful. 
Consider my idea of God.  The thing (or the substance or nature) conceived of in 
this idea of God is God.  Next, consider my idea of an attribute of God such as his 
omnipotence.  On Nolan’s account, that thing or nature, which is conceived in my idea of 
omnipotence, is also God.  The two ideas are ideas of the same thing.  In the first case, I 
attempt to consider God’s entire simple nature. In the second case, I may only attend to one 
particular aspect of God’s nature; but God’s omnipotence is only rationally distinct from God 
                                                
85 Nolan (1998) 175. 
86 AT VIII A: 26; CSM I: 211. 
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himself. God is numerically identical with that thing which is omnipotent. The thing in each 
idea is one and the same. Things that are rationally distinct are metaphysically and 
numerically identical.  In this way, Nolan is able to make sense of passages in which 
Descartes asserts, “number is not distinct from the things numbered”87. There are not two 
separate things we have in mind when we consider the two trees, and the twoness of the 
trees.  The idea of the twoness of the trees is an idea containing the same content as an idea 
of the trees.  On this account, the twoness of the trees is numerically identical in re with the 
trees themselves much like the omnipotent-thing is numerically identical in re with God.  In 
each case, it is the same thing that is being thought about.88   
WR accounts of Cartesian Universals such as Nolan’s are not without their own set 
of problems. A first problem for Nolan’s account concerns the number of innate universals 
that are held by our finite minds. Given the indefinite number of sides a polygon can have, 
and the indefinite89 cardinality of even just the counting numbers, it would seem that our 
finite minds would have to have an infinite number of innate ideas.  But this first problem is 
not the most serious. 
                                                
87 AT VIII A: 26; CSM I: 211. 
88 “We distinguish the two stones in our thought from their number within out thought by 
focusing exclusively on heir twoness and ignoring their extension, duration, existence, etc.  
But the distinction between the two stones and their twoness is confined to our thought; in 
reality, there is no such distinction.” Nolan (1998) 174. See also Nolan (1997b) for more on 
the numeric identity between things that are merely rationally distinct. 
89 Provided that our finite minds were allowed to inquire into such matters, Descartes thinks 
that at best we can only claim there to be an indefinite number of counting numbers.  
Strictly speaking, only God is infinite.  All other cases we may be tempted to think of as 
involving something infinite are cases in which we “merely acknowledge in a negative way 
that any limits [that may exist] cannot be discovered by us” as opposed to positively 
understanding there to be a lack of limits as in the case of infinity. See Principles I:26-27; AT 
VIIIA: 14-15; CSM I: 201-202. 
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The most serious problem arises from Nolan’s use of rational distinction in his view 
about abstraction.  What is in Level 1 is merely rationally distinct from what is in Level 2: the 
two stones are merely rationally distinct from their twoness (or the twoness of the stones).  
Continuing further, if I again abstracted in the manner suggested by Nolan, what is in Level 
2 is merely rationally distinct from what is in Level 3: the twoness of the stones is merely 
rationally distinct from twoness in general.  I’ve merely abstracted out the stones.  
Abstracting out simply means that I don’t attend to the stones, not that they are not part of 
the “thing” in the idea.90  Similarly, the two birds are only rationally distinct from the 
twoness of the birds, and the twoness of the birds is merely rationally distinct from twoness 
in general.  However, on a WR account, there is only one concept of twoness innate in our 
minds.  It is the same general concept of twoness that we get in all the particular instances of 
the two-step iterative abstractions discussed above.  
This claim to a general concept presents an awkward problem for Nolan’s account of 
universals and mathematical objects that has gone unnoticed. Given that (a) the general 
concept of twoness is merely rationally distinct from both the twoness of the stones as well as 
                                                
90 For abstraction doesn’t work in the way the conceptualist readings need:  
This intellectual abstraction consists in my turning my thought away from one part 
of the contents of this richer idea the better to apply it to the other part with 
greater attention.  Thus, when I consider a shape without thinking of the substance 
or the extension whose shape it is, I make a mental abstraction.  I can easily 
recognize this abstraction afterwards when I look to see whether I have derived 
this idea of the shape on its own from some other, richer idea which I also have 
within myself, to which it is joined in such a way that although one can think of the 
one without paying much attention to the other, it is impossible to deny one of the 
other when one thinks of both together.  For I see clearly that the idea of the shape 
in question is joined in this way to the idea of the corresponding extension and 
substance, since it is impossible to conceive a shape while denying that it has an extension or to 
conceive an extension while deny that it is the extension of the substance. (From a letter to 
Gibieuf dated January 19, 1642. AT III: 175; CSMK 202. Emphasis mine.) 
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the twoness of the birds; and that (b) both the twoness of the stones is merely rationally 
distinct from the stones, and the twoness of the birds is merely rationally distinct from the 
birds; then it would seem to follow that the birds are merely rationally distinct from the stones! 
To make the tension more obvious consider this more problematic case: 
At Level 1,  we have an idea of an idea of my Mind and God.   
At Level 2, we have an idea of the twoness of the substances in my idea.   
Finally at Level 3, we have an idea of the idea of twoness in general.   
Recall, however, that what is at Level 1 is merely rationally distinct from what is in 
Level 2, thus, the two substances (God and Mind) are merely rationally distinct from their 
twoness (or the twoness of the substances, God and Mind). Continuing further, what is in 
Level 2 is merely rationally distinct from what is in Level 3.  The twoness of the substances 
I’m thinking about (God and Mind) is merely rationally distinct from twoness in general.  
I’ve merely abstracted out the idea of the substances.  But the universal at Level 3 (the 
concept of twoness in general) is merely rationally distinct from Level 2, so then the concept 
of twoness is merely rationally distinct from both the twoness of the substances as well as the 
twoness of the stones.  But this would make Mind and God merely rationally distinct from 
the two stones!   
This presents a very troubling problem for WR interpretations because for Descartes 
both Mind and God are really distinct from extension.91  This distinction was the third 
Cartesian doctrine. There is a real distinction between extension, minds and God.  If Nolan’s 
theory of rational distinction is to be preserved, the abstract idea of twoness in general that I 
                                                
91 See for examples: AT VIIIA:13-14; CSM I: 201,  ATVII:86, CSM II: 59,  AT V 403; 
CSMK:381. 
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occasioned from the idea of two [extended] trees cannot then be the same abstract concept 
of twoness occasioned from another idea of two things. 
2.3 How To Countenance Real Universals? 
If a consistent account of Cartesian universals is to be given, it must avoid the 
problems of SR views and not locate them in a third realm or in God. A consistent account 
must also account for the conceptualism of the Principles, as the WR accounts do.  
Nevertheless, part of the problem for understanding Cartesian universals in a WR way is that 
it still allows for a realism, albeit a weak one.  By giving an account of numbers that is so 
abstract and general, even if only as innate ideas or concepts, it opens the door to the same 
problems of SR that WR was attempting to avoid, namely that WR also comes into conflict 
with one of the three central Cartesian doctrines.  The only difference is the exchange of the 
problems of the realism of platonic forms under SR for the problem of the realism of the 
concepts under WR.  The need to find a way to countenance the realism for Descartes, strong or weak, 
creates problems.  
No matter what the ontological status of the number is or where the number is 
located, all of these readings of Descartes understand the number as abstract and prior in the 
sense that it can be applied to or instantiated by anything, or that anything can represent its 
true immutable nature (even non-extended things).  Whatever a number is, it is not a 
particular.  The number two is twoness, not two stones, or two trees, or two rocks or two 
souls. While the disparate accounts may not agree on the status, nature or location of a 
number, they do agree about its general, abstract and universal nature.  Any type of object, 
extended or unextended, can occasion the concept or express the nature or exhibit the form 
of twoness.  These views all hold that numbers and their natures are not derived from other 
substances.  Numbers and their natures do not depend on other things (with the exception 
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of God)—and the accounts all agree that numbers do not depend on extension.  But given 
the problems with realism for Descartes, an alternative is needed.  
I propose that we start with the most promising view above: the WR account Nolan 
offers.  Recall that Nolan successfully avoided SR problems by taking very seriously 
Descartes’ claims in the Principles that numbers are modes of thought.  The trouble for WR 
accounts comes in when the ideas of numbers become reified into abstract concepts that are 
distinct from our other innate ideas.  This problem suggests a strategy for avoiding WR’s 
problems: move towards a view in which the numbers reduce to an innate idea we have.  
There are at least a few options, but given Descartes’ commitment to the veracity of our 
clear and distinct perceptions and the problems of locating numbers in God and Minds (i.e., 
SR and WR), we should reduce ideas of numbers to ideas of extension.   
This reduction would allow us to jettison the weak realism involved in abstract or 
truly general ideas of number in favor of a nominalism about ideas of number.  This kind of 
nominalism would make all the so-called “universals” not universals but rather particular 
ideas and names that we make use of in a general, Berkelian sort of way.  As for what those 
particular ideas are like, I think that for Descartes any idea of a number of things qua 
number reduces to an idea whose object is always extension.  That is, ideas of numbers just 
are particular ideas of extension that we use a number-name to signify.  As I show below, 
such a view would avoid the ontological problems that realist accounts face. 
3. Nominalism About Universals: A Sketch 
A nominalist account of Descartes’ universals starts out in much the same way a WR 
account would, particularly with regard to mathematical objects. The WR accounts have 
several strengths with respect to how WR interprets many of the texts in question.  As 
mentioned above, the problems with such accounts arise from the abstract or general quality 
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of the idea they claim is the universal.  And this quality is a subtle but ultimately important 
distinction between WR accounts and my account.  Briefly explaining the similarities and 
differences between WR and my nominalist reading will be useful in filling out just what I 
am suggesting.  It will also clarify any remaining confusions caused by both my attributing to 
WR accounts some form of realism and my contrasting of my reading as one that is opposed 
to nominalism found in WR accounts.  
Indeed, many WR accounts conceive of their conceptualism as opposed to realism, 
by which they mean of a strong Platonic sort. Moreover, they also describe themselves as 
giving a nominalist account of Descartes.92 But proponents of such accounts are quick to 
contrast their readings with the nominalism of empiricists such as Locke93. These 
proponents cite passages94 in which Descartes makes it clear that we do not get our idea of 
mathematical objects empirically through our sense experiences: e.g. our idea of triangle is 
not an idea that we had to arrive at through triangular-shaped visual perceptions.  It is true 
that my claim about Descartes’ nominalism is closely aligned with an idea of nominalism 
typically held by the empiricists.  But the empiricists disagree amongst themselves about our 
ideas of mathematical objects: the account I have in mind is opposed to Locke’s and more 
                                                
92 For more about the realism, conceptualism, and nominalism, see chapters 1-4 of Marilyn 
McCord Adam’s book, William Ockham. 
93 Both Nolan and Chappell emphasize that they do not mean to suggest that Descartes 
thinks that “universal ideas are derived empirically—that the idea of twoness for example 
can be produced in our mind by abstracting from our adventitious idea of two stones…” 
(Nolan (1998): 173) nor are we to think that Descartes is like Locke in the sense that when 
we form an idea of two upon seeing two stones, “we are in effect creating that idea: if first 
comes to be in our minds by the process of abstraction” (Chappell (1997): 121).  Rather the 
abstractive process effects the discovery of an innate idea, not the creation of the idea.  See 
also Nolan (1998) 167. 
94 See AT VII: 382; CSM II: 262. 
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closely aligned with that of Berkeley and of Hume.  The disagreement between Berkeley and 
Locke with respect to our ideas of mathematical objects tracks very closely my disagreement 
with WR about our ideas of universals.  Locke thought that we could form or construct a 
general idea that we call ‘two’ that was neither of two trees, two triangles, two birds, nor two 
minds, etc., etc…  But Berkeley denied the possibility of any such general idea, and instead 
insisted that it is the term or name that is general, not the idea.  The idea is particular and is 
merely regarded as general.  Berkeley thinks an abuse of language is the source of the 
problem for philosophers such as Locke who think they can form abstract ideas.95    This is a 
view that Descartes shares.  Descartes writes in the Principles that one of the causes of error  
is that we attach our concepts to words which do not precisely correspond to real 
things… people often give their assent to words they do not understand, thinking 
the once understood them, or that he got them from others who did understand 
them correctly.96 
Using WR accounts of number, a number term such as ‘two’ becomes general by 
being made the sign or name of an abstract, general idea: the concept twoness.  This idea is the 
same idea that we abstract to when we consider any of our ideas of two things.  This applies 
indifferently for all particular instances of twoness we can think.  For example, whether we 
start with an idea of two trees, two line segments or two minds, we can abstract away from 
the particular set of trees, line segments or minds in the three different ideas to a single, 
numerically identical, general idea of twoness.  It is this general idea of twoness that the 
general term ‘two’ signifies.   
On the nominalist reading, numbers ideas are ways of thinking about particular 
things.  Nominalism will not explain the generality of a term like ‘two’ by appeal to a general 
                                                
95 See section 6 of the Introduction to Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge. 
96 Principles I: 74; AT VII: 37-8; CSM I: 220-221. 
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idea or concept.  A word becomes general when it is used to sign for a particular idea that we 
understand to resemble all other particular ideas to which we would apply the term.  We call 
a particular way of thinking ‘two’ and then use ‘two’ to name all the other particular ways of 
thinking.  When we mean for some particular idea to represent all the other particulars for 
which the term ‘two’ signifies, the particular idea is “regarded” generally and the same term 
used to name that idea also signs other particular ideas that are similar.  For example, when 
we think of the two trees in a particular way, we may name that way of regarding as the ‘two’ 
way.  Then when we think of two line segments in a similar way, we may use the same term 
(‘two’) to name that idea.  There is no single, numerically identical idea named ‘two’.  The 
general term ‘two’ can be used to signify any one of these ideas—with the understanding 
that we are using that particular idea to represent, or stand in for all the other cases that the 
term ‘two’ may apply if we wish.   
What separates Descartes from the likes of Berkeley is the nature of the particular 
ideas that are considered mathematical.  For empiricists like Berkeley or Hume there is no 
true and immutable nature that we come to understand when we think about the 
“mathematical truths”.  And they think the ideas we come to have of so-called 
“mathematical objects” do require empirical experience and do not carry any necessity.  
But Descartes is able to adopt a nominalism that is similar to Berkeley’s and to 
Hume’s while also maintaining that these mathematical objects have true and immutable 
natures.  I agree with WR accounts about universals insofar as they deny that empirical 
experience with the world is a necessary condition to forming ideas of mathematical truths.  
Seeing a triangle drawn on a piece of paper or some other such empirical experience is not 
necessary to produce what Descartes is talking about when he writes of our understanding 
of the nature of the triangle.  But I do not think an abstract innate idea of each mathematical 
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object is necessary either.  Our innate idea of extension can provide the true and immutable 
nature of all our ideas of mathematical objects.  Each universal is merely a name used to 
signify particular ideas of extension.  When we regard our innate idea of extension in certain 
ways, the true and immutable nature (i.e. the essence) of extended substance is the idea that 
is signed by a general name such as ‘triangle’ or ‘two’.97  Descartes seems to suggest as much 
in various passages.  For example, in the fifth set of replies of the Meditations, Descartes 
writes: 
Not that there are in the world substances which have length but no breadth, or 
breadth but no depth; it is rather that the geometrical figures are considered not as 
substances but as boundaries within which a substance is contained. 98 
But boundary, a surface or line, is not a thing unless it is a way to think of the nature 
of extension.99  But as was noted above, Descartes claims in the fifth meditation, whatever is 
true is something100.  A true and immutable nature not only needs to be something, it must 
be a simple thing: an essence.  But a general abstract idea cannot be of something that is 
simple in virtue of its general nature which must apply to different kinds of cases.  Consider 
again what Descartes writes about a boundary or limit: 
We are abstracting, for example when we say that shape is the limit of an extended 
thing, conceiving by the term ‘limit’ something more general than shape, since we 
can talk of the limit of a duration, the limit of a motion, etc… since the term ‘limit’ 
is also applied to other things – such as the limit of a duration or a motion, etc., 
things totally different in kind from shape—it must have been abstracted from 
these as well.  Hence, it is something compounded out of many quite different 
                                                
97 See Nelson (n.d.) for an account of how God’s attributes receive their names. 
98 AT VII: 381; CSM II: 262. 
99 “This concept [body] is thus very different from that of a surface or a line, which cannot 
be understood as complete thing unless we attribute to them not just length and breadth but 
also depth.” (AT VII: 228; CSM II: 160) 
100 AT VII: 65; CSM II:25. 
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natures, and the term ‘limit’ does not have a univocal application in all these 
cases.101 
Here Descartes describes limit as a compound idea: an idea composed of other ideas.  
An abstracted idea cannot be a simple idea—simple ideas being more clear and less obscure.  
Obscure ideas are the source of errors102 as in the case of our confused ideas of ‘cold’ where 
we are unclear as to what is the real or positive thing that our idea represents.103  Just as we 
can be confused in the case of obscure ideas such as ‘cold’ with respect to what is actually 
contained in our idea, we can be similarly confused about what is contained in ideas that we 
have obscured in our attempt to make them too general.104  If we don’t try to conceive of 
‘limit’ too generally, ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’ is just a name for some particular idea of the nature 
of extension: a thing with length, breadth, and depth.  So too, a triangle or the number two is 
a name for some particular idea of the nature of extension.   This idea of extension is a 
simple idea we can conceive clearly and distinctly.  It is an innate idea that God has placed in 
our minds when he created us.  An anti-realist, nominalist account of universals is a possible 
interpretation of Descartes’ mathematical objects. 
                                                
101 Rule 12; AT X: 418-419; CSM I: 44. 
102 “I shall here briefly list all the simple notions which are the basic components of our 
thoughts; and in each case I shall distinguish the clear elements from those which are 
obscure or liable to lead us into error.” (Principles I: 47; AT VIIIA: 22; CSM I: 208.) 
103 “And since there be there can be no ideas which are not as it were of things, if it is true 
that cold is nothing but the absence of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something 
real and positive deserves to be called false; and the same goes for other ideas of this kind.” 
(AT VII: 44; CSM II: 30.) 
And also “But the obscurity of the idea is the only thing that leads me to judge that the idea 
of the sensation of cold represents some object called 'cold' which is located outside me…” 
(AT VII: 234-5; CSM II:164.) 
104 See Principles I:63; AT VIIIA:31; CSM I:215.  For a nice discussion of this passage, see 
Nelson (n.d.). 
   
 
Chapter 3:  Cartesian Counting? Go Figure.  
0. The Motivations Behind A Counting Problem 
The goal of the previous chapter was to show that the texts in Descartes that have 
traditionally been thought to recommend some form of realism about mathematical objects 
need not be read that way.  These texts do not require Descartes to be interpreted as a 
realist. Moreover, a realism results in consequences that are in tension with the most 
fundamental principles of his philosophy.  While the realisms invoked on Descartes’ behalf 
have varied in the ontological grounding of the mathematical objects, these accounts all 
agree with respect to the abstract and general nature of these universals.   
 I sought to bring out this primary difference between the realist readings and the 
nominalist alternative I have sketched out over the non-abstract nature of our ideas of 
mathematical objects.  Furthermore, under a nominalist reading the true immutable nature 
contained in any of our mathematical ideas is not the innate idea of the universals 
themselves. Rather the true nature of these ideas is our innate idea of the true and immutable 
nature of extension.  Our mathematical ideas all derive from an idea of extension: there are 
no numbers that do not depend on our idea of the nature of extension.  The idea of 
extension is prior to our mathematical ideas.  Thus, metaphysically speaking, all of our 
mathematical ideas reduce to an idea of extension: the ultimate object of thought is always 
extended substance.  The corresponding epistemic claim follows: all of our mathematical 
ideas must conceptually contain an idea of extension.  Mathematical thinking depends 
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metaphysically and epistemologically on a prior idea of extension such that if the idea of 
extension were lacking, the mathematical ideas could never naturally occur.  
Such a nominalist position may be easier to defend when the universal or 
mathematical object in question is a triangle or some other geometrical figure, but the 
position is far more dubious to defend when the universal is a number such as two.  While 
realists may not agree on the status, nature or location of a number, they do agree about its 
general, abstract and thus universal nature.  Whether extended or unextended, any type of 
object can occasion the concept, express the nature or exhibit the form of twoness.  To a 
realist our ideas of number need not ever involve extension.  In slightly different terms, 
these realist views all hold that numbers and their natures are not derived from other 
substances.  Numbers and their natures do not depend on other things (with the exception 
of God), so they do not depend on extension.  Realists of all stripes can set aside their 
differences and unite on at least this: nominalist interpretations in which ideas of extension 
are prior to our ideas of numbers cannot be correct.   
If numbers depend on extension, viz. if ideas of numbers contain some idea of 
extension, absent extension we would be unable to count things.  Unextended things, by 
definition are not extended, and our ideas of them do not contain extension.  It seems ideas 
of numbers would not apply to unextended things on a nominalist account for there is no 
extension from which the can be derived.  But do we not count unextended things?  Can we 
not think of a number of unextended things?  
There is no reason to think that numbers do not apply to extended as well as 
unextended things equally.  In fact it is perfectly reasonable to say that we can count or 
speak about the quantity of things such as value, time, souls, ideas and other unextended 
things.  We do this kind of counting much of the time, so it would seem ludicrous to think 
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that Descartes would deny that we can.  And so much the worse for any nominalist 
interpretation of Descartes that thinks that he is committed to a view where our ideas of 
numbers are of extension only.  Any case in which we count unextended things appears to 
present a problem for such a view. Common features of realist interpretations, sc. that 
numbers are not derived from extension, lead the realist to appeal to cases in which we 
count unextended things to generate for the nominalist what I call a Counting Problem.  If this 
problem can be properly formulated, it would be a very compelling counterexample to my 
view.  
Fortunately, there is no formulation of the Counting Problem that can adequately 
serve as a counterexample to nominalism, and what may seem like potentially problematic 
cases of counting are actually easily accounted for using the nominalist account.  My 
argument starts by clarifying what is required for a case of counting to not involve extension 
(§1).  The metaphysical status of the things being counted is only one of four different ways 
extension can be involved in counting.  The others concern the modes in which we 
represent distinct things and the determination of a quantity.  The realist needs to formulate 
a case of counting in which extension is not involved in any of the four ways.  I discuss 
several cases that a realist might make in attempting to satisfy the necessary conditions for 
the Counting Problem (§2).  These cases serve to illustrate the difficulties involved in 
formulating a Counting Problem and highlights the central hurdle facing the realist: the idea 
of a quantity requires extension.  This hurdle emerges once the four ways extension can be 
involved in counting is made clear and we consider passages about what is involved in 
counting and measuring that realist have ignored (§3). In addressing the failure of Counting 
Problem attempts, I also show why Descartes might have thought that numbers depend on 
extension, sc. things that admit of part/whole relationships.  But this view does not mean 
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that Descartes thought we are unable to count unextended (and therefore indivisible) things.  
The solution I suggest (§4) is that unextended things can be counted by analogy to 
extension.  This solution is based on Descartes’ discussion and uses of analogy found in 
various places of his correspondence.  To conclude (§5) I briefly revisit the attempted 
Counting Problem cases to illustrate how counting by analogy might work.  This use of 
analogy as a way to determine numeric quantities not only accords nicely with the 
nominalism of Descartes but it is also able to account for Descartes’ brief but surprising 
comments concerning the determination of the ratio of two intensive magnitudes. 
1. Conditions For Formulating A Counting Problem 
To demonstrate that extension is not required for counting, the realist needs to show 
that counting is possible even absent extension or an idea of extension.  She just needs to 
provide a case in which we can have (for example) an idea of two things that does not 
involve extension.  But what it is to “have an idea of two things that does not involve 
extension” is ambiguous.  There are different ways to understand how extension is not 
involved in our idea of two things, and each is satisfied differently so that what might satisfy 
one understanding of the requirement many not satisfy the other.  Let me address four of 
the most salient interpretations.  
(1) We can understand this requirement to be focused one the metaphysical nature 
of the objects themselves (idea of two things qua nature of things).  In this case, all that 
would be required is for there to be two unextended, metaphysically distinct things in the 
world that we can think about.  We need not think of both of these things at the same time, 
nor do we have to recognize in our thought that they are not metaphysically identical.  They 
may even be represented in our minds as extended.  We merely need there to be two 
unextended things about which we may form ideas. 
50 
 
 (2) We can understand this requirement to be about the objects as they are 
represented in our idea (idea of the things qua representation of the things).  In this case, our 
representation of metaphysically distinct things may not involve extension.  The things in 
our ideas, as we think of them or represent them, need to be unextended. 
(3) We can understand the requirement to be about the idea of things as not 
numerically identical.  To satisfy the requirement in this case would be to recognize 
numerically distinct things as such without using an idea of extension, or representing the 
things in an extensive way to facilitate the idea of their mutual distinctness.  The things 
merely need to be recognized as non-identical while not represented with extension. 
Finally (4) we can understand this requirement to be about the idea of the quantity 
(idea of two things qua two).  This is less about the nature of the things or the way the things 
are represented, but more about the way their quantity (that is, their count or measure) is 
understood.  It requires more than recognizing that there are distinct, non-identical things; 
but that number of distinct, non-identical things is two.   This difference between these 
concepts is more easily recognized in cases where there are larger quantities.  Consider a 
bucket of marbles.  We can have an idea of there being many numerically distinct and non-
identical marbles but not have an idea of how many marbles there are.  In order to satisfy 
this requirement, we would have to be able to understand that the distinct things are two in 
number without needed to use an idea of extension.  
In order for a realist to use a Counting Problem as a counterexample to my nominal 
interpretation of numbers, she needs to formulate a very particular type of case.  To deny the 
metaphysical and epistemological relationship between our ideas of numbers and our idea of 
extension found in my account, the counterexample the realist is looking for needs to meet 
all four interpretations of what is required.  These four interpretations can be reformulated 
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into two general conditions, one I will call the metaphysical condition because it pertains 
mostly to objects being counted, the other I will call epistemological condition because it 
pertains to a particular type of idea we need to have about the objects.   
The metaphysical condition covers the first three interpretations (the metaphysical 
nature, the representation of, and the non-identity of the object).  It requires that the objects 
we count be unextended, that the objects cannot even be represented to us in our ideas 
through extension when we count them, nor can we use the extension to distinguish or 
individuate the objects we are counting from one another.   
The epistemological condition covers the fourth interpretation (the idea of the numeric 
quantity of objects) and requires that when we consider the number of things we are 
counting, we must be able to think of them in terms of their quantity without using 
extension to represent their number or quantity. 
Because the realist aims to deny that our ideas of numbers reduce to an idea of 
extension, she needs to produce a case in which the number idea cannot possibly be an idea 
of extension: a case where no extension is necessary at all.  If a proposed counterexample 
fails to meet these two conditions, the example would not yet present the attempted 
challenge for my interpretation of Descartes.  The first and second conditions are 
importantly different.  The first condition requires that the things being counted are not 
extended and that we are able to think of them without including in our idea an idea of 
extension.  If she fails to meet the first condition, then the idea of the number of (even 
merely partially) extended things would contain extension.  But the realist wants to eliminate 
the possibility that it is extended parts that are considered when we count those things, so 
she must not fail to meet the first condition.   It is not enough that what we end up counting 
is not an extended thing.  The second condition requires that in counting unextended things, 
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we are not making use of an idea of extension in the counting process, e.g. that we not index 
the unextended objects to extension when we count them.  If she fails to meet the second 
condition, then the things we are counting are being represented by extension.  Again, this 
idea would not demonstrate that extension is not necessary for number, so likewise she must 
not fail to meet the second condition.  
This difference (the distinction between the metaphysical status of the things 
counted and the epistemic act involved in counting them) is crucial to my treatment of the 
Counting Problem.  Regardless of whether or not an example meets the metaphysical 
condition, I argue that the realist will never be able to meet the second epistemic condition. 
What is most easy to overlook is the difference between any of the first three requirements 
(that constitutes the metaphysical condition) and the fourth one (the epistemological 
condition).     
Some cases are better than others at satisfying the first condition.  Instead of 
immediately turning to a discussion of what I take to be the best case, I will first consider 
some of the more problematic attempts.  Going through several attempts to formulate the 
Counting Problem will be instructive and useful.  The development of the cases will make 
clearer the four different ways of interpreting what is required for an adequate 
counterexample.  The subtlety of these four distinctions, and the ease in which they can be 
confused is why there are far fewer clear-cut cases than the realist initially believes that can 
satisfy the first condition.  And as I show below, this difficulty of extracting extension from our ideas 
of the individuated, unextended things supports my explanation of how they could be counted in the first place. 
 It is important that the realist not overlook the second condition because every 
attempted Counting Problem will fail the second condition.  Extension is necessarily 
contained in out conception of things as counted or measured.  Ultimately, I think that 
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Descartes would say an idea of extension is necessary even for thinking of things as 
numerically non-identical.  That is: extension must be involved in our idea of two things in the 
third way of understanding an “idea of two things”.  This view would mean that even the 
first condition of a Counting Problem could never be satisfied.  However, as I will not be 
arguing for this stronger claim here, I will allow that a realist can formulate a case for the 
Counting Problem that will pass the first condition. 
2. Attempts To Generate A Counting Problem 
2.1 Counting Monetary Value 
A promising strategy for the realist may start with cases in which she counts abstract 
objects like value, measures of health, counts of abstractions (such as the numbers 
themselves) and so on. These cases seem to count immaterial, abstract objects.  I will 
illustrate the general strategy of response for these types of cases using the example case of 
counting money.105  The point of this example will be show that counting or measuring 
abstractions such as monetary-value do not make as strong and straightforward a 
counterexample as a realist may suppose.  The ontology of the abstractions quantified are 
themselves questionable, and the nominalist account of Descartes that I am exploring would 
consider the ontological status of value or money to be as suspect as the ontological status of 
numbers.  At the end of the day, a nominalist-Descartes would be more amenable to an 
account of that which we call “value” or “money” as reducing to proportions of ratios of 
commodities, or rates of exchange between various goods and services.  The suspicion about 
the realist’s abstraction, value, prevents it from being a clear counterexample that satisfies 
the metaphysical condition. 
                                                
105 I am grateful to Marc Lange for raising the “money-objection” and his helpful comments 
in our discussions on the topic. 
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Consider the way we can count money.  At first glance, money doesn’t seem to be 
extended, yet we can count money (indeed, many people often do so frequently and with 
great relish).  But to successfully meet the first condition and avoid counting extended 
things, we must ignore what I will call “hard-currency.” Hard currency is anything that we 
can physically exchange in our monetary transactions; this includes both commodity-currency 
and fiat-currency.  Commodity-currency are things that have some intrinsic value like gold or 
silver bars.  Fiat-currency are things that are used to represent an extrinsic value.  These 
things usually do not have much intrinsic value or they are used to designate something of 
greater value.   Examples of fiat-currency include bank- or government-issued notes, coins, 
cashier checks, bonds, and other legal tender.  Fiat currency merely represents money, it is 
not money itself. 
This difference between counting things and counting representations of those 
things can be illustrated with an (albeit overly simplified) example.  Suppose we are back in 
the mean and harsh economy of the elementary school cafeteria. In this economy, the 
currency is chocolate pudding cups.  Pudding cups get traded for not just hamburgers, but 
also solutions to homework problems.  Everyone knows that Wimpy’s mother packs a 
chocolate pudding cup in his lunch box every day.  Having already spent today’s pudding 
cup to bribe the hall monitor, Wimpy notices that Olive has not consumed her hamburger.  
Wimpy just loves hamburgers, so he offers to give her his pudding cup tomorrow for her 
hamburger today. She agrees, and Wimpy writes on his napkin a promissory note that 
transfers over his pudding cup.   
The napkin, which is otherwise just a napkin, can be thought of as fiat-currency that 
represents the actual currency, the pudding cup.  As fiat-currency, it represents the pudding 
cup:  the napkin is not itself a pudding cup.  Similar to the fiat-currency napkin, a fiat-
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currency dollar bill is only called a dollar in virtue of its representing a measure of money, one 
dollar.  The bill itself is not a dollar, much like the napkin is not a pudding cup.  When the 
realist points to cases in which we count money, she does not mean cases in which we count 
dollars using dollar-bills.  
Bur the realist is not yet done formulating her example.  She still has to explain what 
or how she is thinking when she is counting.  It is not enough to declare that she is counting 
(abstract) dollars.  (This could perhaps take care of only one of the three requirements that 
comprise the metaphysical condition).  In order to count them, she needs to be able to think 
of them and she hasn’t yet explained how that can be done without using extension.  Even if 
a sparse Cartesian ontology ruled out the existence of money (that is that is a real thing or 
substance), Descartes allows that our ideas may at least contain something that is true or is 
caused by something with reality.106  Perhaps “money” is similar to “limit” or “cold”: ideas 
where the names we use to signify them have tricked us into thinking that they are things.  
But the realist doesn’t need money to be a real substance; she just needs what is confused in 
the idea we call money to not be extended.  Put another way: she needs to show that we are 
not representing money using extension (the second of four different interpretations).  I do 
not think that the realist can.  I will explain why I am skeptical the realist can rise to this 
challenge by returning to the school cafeteria.   
Suppose they are now more sophisticated and moved from a system of direct 
bartering to using pudding cups as commodity-currency to facilitate more complex trades.  
Perhaps everyone had accounts that kept track of their wealth in units of CPCs (chocolate 
pudding cups).  Unfortunately the school has been experiencing some hard-times.  Bluto has 
                                                
106 See AT VII: 165; CSM II: 116-7. 
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ousted the hall monitor and inflation is rising. Now, Wimpy has to transfer 6 CPCs for just a 
bite of Olive’s hamburger and homework solutions are billed at 1.8 CPC per line.  The 
Math-letes have been busy managing everyone’s accounts, and sending out regular account 
balances.  Today, Wimpy’s balance is down to 27.5 CPC. 
How can we count how much money Wimpy has?  Since their economy is built 
around the commodity chocolate pudding cups, at the end of the day, their money-units, 
CPC, is understood in terms of that commodity, i.e., chocolate pudding cups.  (Indeed, as 
Searle and many others have noted, a monetary system depends upon conventions to treat 
certain things as standing in for certain possibly abstract magnitudes, such as work or 
value.107)   But counting his money in terms of CPCs is not the only option available to 
Wimpy.  He can count his money in terms of the things he can trade them for, i.e. their 
purchasing power.  How much money does Wimpy have?  He has enough money for an 
essay 15 lines long, or for 4.5 bite of Olive’s hamburger.  Wimpy takes big bites, so he thinks 
he has enough money for a whole hamburger.  In Wimpy’s case we represent money either 
in terms of the currency used or the things we can trade for with them. 
My skepticism about this objection from money is very similar to the cafeteria-
economy case.  I grant that our economy is much more complex and sophisticated than the 
school cafeteria’s economy, but the basic principle remains the same.  Regardless of how 
abstract or immaterial the objector thinks money might be, any understanding we have of 
our currency only makes sense of in terms of the extended forms of that currency.  I 
understand the dollars in my account only in terms of the bills that I can get from an ATM 
and exchange for goods in trades.  When I think about converting my dollars into Euros and 
                                                
107 Searle (1984). 
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the exchange rate, I think about how many bills in various denominations have to be traded 
for various denominations of other kinds of bills. 
The realist is after this monetary value that is given in terms of different forms of 
currencies, so she can point out that it is the monetary-value that is quantified and expressed or 
represented in terms of one currency or another.  The objector notes that exchange rates 
between currencies only make sense because there is some same value that we are talking 
about.  For example, as I write this, one US dollar is worth .83 Euros.  Imagine you have a 
choice between getting one million US dollars and getting 830,000 Euros. Ignoring preferred 
locales, costs of exchanging currencies, etc., you should be indifferent between these two 
outcomes because both choices represent the same thing: the value expressed by that money.   
The realist wants to claim that this equivalence indicates that there is a quantity of 
value that is represented by various forms of currencies.  Just as we can draw a distinction 
between money (dollars) and hard currency (dollar bills), she now carefully separates the 
monetary-value measured from the form of currency used to measure it.  The value of the 
money itself is distinct from the expression of value in terms of dollars, Euros, or yen (the 
money itself).  And so the realist means to use this monetary-value to generate the 
counterexample.  In this sense one might think of temperature or heat as analogous to 
monetary-value, and the temperature measured in terms of degrees in Kelvin, Celsius, or 
Fahrenheit as analogous to dollars, Euros, or yen.108 
But, again, the issue is what is in the idea or understanding of the abstract notion of 
the value of money. Our understanding of this value exists only in terms of its various 
                                                
108 For more about the measurement of temperature, see Hasok Chang’s excellent book 
(2004), Inventing Temperature.  The discussion in Chapter 4 about ontological and theoretical 
uncertainties regarding what was being measured are particularly interesting.   
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(equivalent) representations in particular monies or in terms of what else they can yield in a 
trade.  Pretend that CPCs did not start as commodities and that CPC units are not pudding 
cups.  Conceived of as just a measure of monetary-value, how do we consider the value?  
Wimpy’s ways of considering the quantity of CPC was to either think of it as represented 
through the fiat currency (the number of chocolate pudding cups) or to think of it in terms 
of what they can be traded for, sc. the value was a hamburger, or a 15-line essay. 
These responses are in line with a nominalism about abstract objects.  What we have 
in mind when we say we are thinking of some quantity of value is some idea that we regard 
as representing other things we would consider acceptable trades: w dollars, x Euros, y guns, 
or z lbs. of butter.  A nominalist views counting money as a case that does not pass the first 
condition because the abstract thing the realist wishes to count isn’t a thing that we can think 
without using an extended representation.  At the very least, the money-counting case is not 
as clear-cut as a realist may have initially thought. However, other possibilities still remain 
which we should consider on her behalf. 
2.2 Counting People 
Another way the realist may try to construct her counterexample is from counting 
distinct souls or minds.  But if we think more carefully about what is available to Descartes 
in terms of how different minds may be counted, it will become clear to us why this also 
cannot be done without appealing to extension. We would fail in terms of representing the 
thing itself—the mind—thereby failing to satisfy the first condition; but also in terms of how 
to understand there being a number of minds, thereby failing the second condition.  Saving 
the failure of the second condition for last, when I collect all the various versions of the 
objection from counting together, let us now turn presently to how formulating the 
objection from counting minds fails the first condition. 
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Counting minds is perhaps the most natural version of the objection that the realist 
considers.  Given Descartes’ real distinction between mind and body, the immaterial, non-
extended mind is naturally one of the first places to look for something that we can count 
that is not extended.  Despite the fact that we only know ourselves as mind-body unions, we 
have a clear and distinct idea of ourselves as thinking things, minds—and as minds, it is part 
of our essence that we are not extended.  So far, this seems pretty promising for the 
satisfaction of the first condition.  Clearly, the realist means to count the minds, which are 
not extended by their very nature; she does not mean to count the number of mind-body 
unions.  She is thinking, when she counts people like Peter and Paul, of Peter’s mind and 
Paul’s mind—not the embodied minds of Peter and Paul, for she wishes to avoid the extension 
of their embodiment representing the mind of Peter and Paul.  But this presents a problem.  
In what sense can we know or think about the other mind that we are counting? 
We cannot have direct access to other minds—Descartes finds such a thought utterly 
unintelligible.109  The problem this presents for formulating an objection that will pass the 
first condition is to find a way for us to come to know or think of the other minds we wish 
to count without having to think of them as the minds that are united to the bodies that we 
use to represent them.  It seems the only way I can do this is to think of other minds as also 
embodied, and then come to know the minds indirectly though the extension that they are 
intimately joined with.  However, the realist may protest that we can have an idea of mind 
(for example like our own) directly; and a clear and distinct perception of that idea of our 
mind would include its immaterial, non-extended nature.  The mind is what the realist is 
                                                
109  In a letter to More, Descartes writes that “sensory nerves so fine that they could be 
moved by the smallest particles of matter are no more intelligible to me than a faculty enabling our 
mind to sense or perceive other minds directly.” (AT V: 341; CSMK: 372; emphasis mine) 
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interested in counting.  What the mind is can, at least in one case in particular, be known 
entirely without being represented through extension.  This strikes the realist as enough for 
her purposes, at least insofar as her present interest is in passing the first condition.  All she 
needs to show to satisfy the first condition is that the things we are to count can be known 
without having to be represented through extension first, and she has done this: we can 
clearly and distinctly perceive (our own) immaterial mind.  We can know our mind directly.  
Once we do, even if we don’t know Peter’s mind and Paul’s mind directly, we can think 
about their minds being like our own. 
Here, again, upon further consideration, things turn out to be more complicated than 
they seem.  In this formulation of the objection, we are interested in counting minds: it could 
be Peter’s mind and Paul’s mind, but it also could be Peter’s mind and my mind.  We are not 
counting my mind and my mind.  I need to be able to have the concept of more than one 
mind, but without locating them in different regions of extension on pain of failing the first 
condition.  The problem for the realist still remains.  I can’t think of other minds qua other 
without appealing to extension.  Put in different terms, without being able to appeal to 
extension, the realist has a problem of individuating minds from one another.  Whatever 
difficulty we may have separating our own mind from Peter’s without appealing to 
extension, it is even more difficult to think that Peter’s mind is separate and distinct from 
Paul’s mind without appealing to extension.  Without direct knowledge of other minds, in 
virtue of what could we say that those are two distinct minds?110 
                                                
110 As an interesting side note, if we allow ourselves the possibility of knowledge of other 
distinct minds through their embodiment, Descartes thinks the next step is learning how to 
tell there is an embodied mind there as opposed to a mere animal that has no soul.  The 
crucial difference between a human and a mere animal is the human’s ability to use signs or 
names to signify our ideas.  Our ability to use language—to assign names for our purely 
intellectual thoughts—is distinctive.  Descartes does not mean just words that we say and 
hear or write and read, but also gestured words; but no matter the form, all these words and 
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2.3 Counting Our Ideas 
 Based on the two previous cases, the realist may now shift her strategy—
realizing that she can avoid those problems and issues by formulating her object by using the 
ideas of her own mind, to which she does have direct access, and is by its very essence not 
extended.   
If she formulates her counterexample based on counting ideas in her own mind, she 
will not have to worry about the first condition, for the thing that she intends to count, her 
ideas, are not extended.  However, as before, she will have to avoid counting ideas that 
contain extended things.  Since the nominalist is claiming that ideas of numbers of things are 
ideas of extension considered in particular ways, she needs to be able to find a case where no 
idea of extension is involved in order to formulate a successful case.  Formulating a 
counterexample using her own ideas, there are two options open to her.  She can either base 
her count on the duration of thoughts or on the content of thoughts.  I will consider each 
below. 
2.3.1 Counting Ideas—With Respect To Time 
The nice feature of formulating a counterexample based on counting the time that 
thought lasts is that the realist can use just a single thought, like the thought, “I am: I exist”.  
This is a promising start for two reasons.  One, the content of the thought does not contain 
any extension.  The thought is just a clear and distinct perception of my mind.  As 
                                                                                                                                            
names convey to us that its source can only be another mind.  No matter what form the 
words are conveyed (either we see the writing or gestures, hear the words spoken, or feel the 
braile or gesturing of the other person’s hands) we known them only as they are conveyed to 
us through our bodily sense modalities.  The other mind, when we discover that another 
mind is there, is known to us only indirectly through representations that necessarily involve 
extension: both in thinking of it as being distinct from our own mind in that it occupies an 
other region of extension, and also in our method of thinking of it as another embodied 
mind as opposed to a mere animal. 
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mentioned above, minds are essentially, i.e., necessarily, not extended.  This leads to the 
second reason: the thought itself, a mode of the mind, is also not extended.  Descartes is 
very clear that thoughts, as modes of the mind, are not extended. 
Despite these promising features, I argue that the case of counting time fails to 
satisfy the first condition for it is analogous to the case of counting money in the following 
way.  Just as money is understood in terms of currency, which is in turn understood in terms 
of extension (fiat-currency); so too is duration understood in terms of time, which is in turn 
understood in terms of extension (its motion).  Descartes, in his discussion of time and 
duration, writes that:   
For example, when time is distinguished from duration taken in the general sense 
and called the measure of movement, it is simply a mode of thought.  For the 
duration which we understand to be involved in the movement is certainly no 
different than the duration involved things which do not move.  This is clear from 
the fact that if there are two bodies moving for an hour, one slowly and the other 
quickly, we do not reckon the amount of time to be greater in the latter case than 
the former, even though the amount of movement may be greater.  But in order to 
measure the duration of all things, we compare their duration with the duration of 
the greatest and most regular motions which give rise to years and days, and we call 
this duration “time”.  Yet nothing is thereby added to duration, taken in this 
general sense, except for a mode of thought.111  
Time is what we call measures of duration, much like currency measures money.  
And what our idea of times amounts to is an idea of motion.  This is significant because 
motion is an attribute of extension112, exclusively113.  Time is measure of duration with 
respect to a regular motion, like the motion of the sun across, the sky, or even the pendulum 
of a clock.  Regular motions of bodies represent time and duration to us in the way that we 
                                                
111 Principles Part I: 57; AT VIIIA: 27; CSM I: 212. 
112 Principles I: 48; AT VIIIA: 23; CSM I: 208-9. 
113 Principles I: 53; AT VIIIA: 25; CSM I: 210-11. 
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might think printed bits of paper represent currency or money.  Just as we cannot have an 
idea of money without having an idea of its extended representation, so too we cannot think 
of time without thinking of the motions of bodies that represent it.  Thus, ideas of duration 
or time, for Descartes, depend on ideas of extension.  In a letter to More, Descartes even 
writes that it “involves a contradiction to conceive of any duration intervening between the 
destruction of an earlier world and the creation of a new one”114 –further suggesting that 
Descartes thought extension to be a necessary part of our conception of duration. 
2.3.2 Counting Ideas—With Respect To The Content 
The second strategy the realist can adopt to formulate a case is to count ideas based 
on the content.  Again, for the similar reason previously mentioned, counting ideas has the 
advantage of counting a thing that is, as a mode of the mind, not extended. Burman reports 
Descartes as saying, “Thought will be extended and divisible with respect to its duration, 
since duration can be divided into parts.  But it is not extended and divisible with respect to 
its nature, since its nature remains unextended.”115 The only thing the realist needs to be 
concerned with is finding suitable ideas to count, i.e., ones that do not involve extended 
things.   
One possibility she might try is to use sensory ideas, like ideas of sounds, to serve 
this end.  There are two ways we can use the content of ideas as things we count.  She can 
either count the number of ideas we have and individuate them based on content, or she can 
count the number of things within the same idea.  I will start with the former.   
                                                
114 AT V: 343; CSMK: 373. 
115 AT V: 148: CSMK: 335. 
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 An example of how she can count the number of ideas based on sounds is to 
individuate the ideas based on the different sounds we hear—examples include: the different 
notes of a song, where each different note or sound is a different idea we count; or perhaps 
the different sounds of different voices singing in a choir are the different ideas we can 
count.  Each of these cases presents its own challenges.  If the realist attempts to count the 
notes of a song, she will run back into the same problems concerning our conception of 
time from above.  To conceive of the different notes, i.e., to individuate one from another, 
or even the same note that occurs more than once, would be to notice the changing 
succession of notes that make up the tune.  The idea of succession and time requires the idea 
of the motion of bodies.  It seems the realist is best to avoid a successive series of ideas.  
The other example given, the many different voices of a choir, each constituting a different 
idea that one can count, is also problematic.  In this case the problem is with the 
individuation of one voice from another.  Perhaps one voice is higher, and the other lower.  
Would Descartes have to grant that those can be individuated and counted?  In the far less 
distant past, P.F. Strawson116 has considered a very similar problem regarding whether one 
could individuate and reidentify sound particulars without appeal to a space. 117  While there 
are some large differences in their respective projects, I think there are enough similarities 
that Strawson’s position is useful in at least suggesting a possible Cartesian response.  The 
individuation of different sound-ideas relies on making a comparative or relative judgment: 
one note being higher than the other. Strawson insists that such comparisons seem to rely 
                                                
116 Strawson (1959). 
117 I thank Bob Adams for suggestion here. 
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on a spatial analogy118, for “relations between elements in respect of the auditory analogue of 
the spatial dimension cannot be presented simultaneously, all at once… two auditory 
elements cannot be heard all at once as at a certain auditory distance from one another” and 
“the momentary states of the sound-patches of the auditory scene do not audibly exhibit the 
auditory analogue of spatial relations to each other at a moment.”119  Strawson does not 
think it is possible to individuate sounds that are at the same moment without making an 
appeal to extension.  And I think this is also what Descartes would claim.   Perhaps a 
suggestion of such a view can be found in a very brief comment Descartes makes about 
comparing intensive magnitudes in Rule 14 where he writes that we cannot compare shades 
of white without imagining shapes of white patches:  
One thing can of course be said to be more or less white than another, one sound 
more or less sharp than another, and so on; but we cannot determine exactly 
whether the greater exceed the lesser by a ratio of 2 to 1 or 3 to 1 unless we have 
recourse to a certain analogy with the extension of a body that has shape.120  
I will take up this surprising remark about intensive quantities in greater detail 
elsewhere. Let us move on for though I think Descartes might say that we often measure 
abstract quantities using physical instantiations even if only imaginary, there is still the more 
promising option of using the content of a single instance of her ideas open to the realist.  
Taking the lessons we have just learned from the sound cases, the realist realizes that the 
content that is to be counted in her single idea (so she can avoid the issues of time and 
succession) should be as distinct from one another as possible (so she can avoid problems 
                                                
118 Later, I will return to what Strawson calls “spatial analogy” and what I have called 
“appealing to an idea of extension”, and which just is to make something “extended by 
analogy” as Descartes would say. 
119 Strawson (1959) 79-80. 
120 AT X: 441; CSM I: 58. 
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that resemble those found in the case of sound) while still being unextended by their very 
nature.  Such a case would be the strongest possible form of her objection. 
2.4 The Strongest Case: Counting Substances In An Idea 
The strongest version of the realist’s argument is to start from an idea that requires 
no extension to represent the objects at all, one where the objects by their very nature are 
not extended, but are very clearly distinct from one another.  We can have clear and distinct 
ideas of two distinct non-extended things: our own minds, and God.  All the realist has to do 
is find a case where we think of both of these two things in a single thought.  There are 
many possibilities, like “I’m not god” or “I’m distinct from god”.   In such a case, there are 
two different things in the thought: the “I” and God.  These two natures are so distinct, 
there is no question about their individuation.  Thus, in this single unextended thought, the 
realist can count two (necessarily) unextended things.  This formulation of her 
counterexample satisfies the first condition.  But as I will argue below, it does not satisfy the 
second condition that they be counted without any appeal to extension.  In fact, no case can 
ever satisfy the second condition. 
3. The Problem For Counting Problems: Part-Whole Relations 
There is a crucial set of texts that Realist interpretations have so far ignored.  These 
texts appear in Descartes’ earlier manuscript, Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Rules).  In this 
section I will review what Descartes writes about numbers in the Rules, and then explain how 
it connects number to the essence or principle attribute of extension. 
Simply put, for Descartes, ideas of numbers are ideas of parts, and parts are 
conceptually entwined with divisibility.  In Rule 16 of the Rules, Descartes reminds us that 
numbers have “a dual function” which is “sometimes to express order, sometimes 
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measure.”121   Descartes writes in Rule 14 regarding the two that orders differ from measures 
in that when we are said to be counting, we consider the order of the parts in relation to the 
whole; but when we are said to be measuring, we are regarding the whole as being divided up 
into parts:  
By ‘dimension’ we mean simply a mode or aspect in respect of which some subject 
is considered measurable.  Thus length, breadth and depth are not the only 
dimensions of a body: weight too is a dimension--the dimension in terms of which 
objects are weighed.  Speed is a dimension--the dimension of motion, and there are 
countless other instances of this sort.  For example, division into several equal parts 
whether it be real or merely intellectual division is, strictly speaking, the dimension in terms of 
which we count things.  The mode which gives rise to number is strictly speaking a 
species of dimension, though there are some differences between the meaning of 
the two terms.  If we consider the order of the parts in relation to the whole, we are then 
said to be counting; if on the other hand, we regard the whole as being divided up into parts, 
we are measuring it.  For example, we measure centuries in terms of years, days hours, 
minutes; if on the other hand we count minutes, hours days and year, we end up 
with centuries. 122   
An intuitive way to grasp Descartes’ distinction between count and measure is to 
consider what will held fixed and what will be allowed to vary.  When we are counting, we 
fix our units of measure and it is the whole (the sum or total) that we allow as a variable 
quantity.  In contrast, when we are measuring, we start with a fixed quantity, and it is the 
unity with which we use to measure it that we may vary.  Descartes’ example of a century is 
helpful for illustrating the subtle distinction.   
When we are said to be counting something, we are thinking about the how the parts 
of some total or larger thing relate to the whole thing.  Thus, we first start off with the parts, 
like minutes, hours, days, or years, and we think about its relationship (a relation of order) to 
some whole that the parts come to comprise, their total, like a century.  On the other hand, 
                                                
121 Rule 16, AT X: 457; CSM I: 68. 
122 Rule 14, AT X: 448; CSM I: 62. Emphasis added.  
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we would be measuring something if we first start off thinking of a thing as a whole and then 
consider (in a relation of measure) the various ways we can divide it up in to parts.  In this 
case, we could measure a century in various ways, depending on what kind of division of 
parts we would use, it could be divided into (and thereby measured in terms of) minutes, 
hours, days, or years. Descartes thinks that having parts is preconditioned on divisibility: 
Now tangibility or impenetrability in body is… not a true and essential differentia 
such as I claim extension to be.  Consequently, just as man is not defined as an 
animal capable of laughter, but as a rational animal, so body should be defined not 
by impenetrability but by extension.  This is confirmed by the fact that tangibility 
and impenetrability involve a reference to parts and presuppose the concept of division or 
limitation; where as we can conceive a continuous body of indeterminate size, or an 
indefinite body in which there is nothing to consider but extension. 123 
The condition that gives rise to a number, be it a count or a measure, is the ability to 
think about things in terms of wholes and parts; in other words, divisibility.   
The essence of extension, what separates it from all other substances, is among other 
things its divisibility.  There are many passages in which he connects divisibility (i.e. having 
parts within parts) with the essence or nature of extension.  Here are just a few examples: 
For example, the nature of a body includes divisibility along with extension in space, and 
since divisibility is an imperfection, it is certain that God is not a body.124  
[W]hile to extended substance belong size (that is, extension in length, breadth, and 
depth), shape, motion, position, division of component parts and the like.125  
[A]nd divisibility is contained in the nature of body, or of an extended thing (for we 
cannot conceive of any extended thing which is so small that we cannot divide it, at 
least in our thought).126  
                                                
123 AT V: 269; CSMK: 361. 
124 Principles I: 23; AT VIIIA: 13; CSM I: 201. 
125 Principles I: 48; AT VIIIA: 23; CSM I: 208-9. Emphasis mine. 
126  AT VII: 163; CSM II: 115. 
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Furthermore, extension is differentiated from all other substances through its divisibility.  That 
is, what makes extension uniquely different and unlike other substances is that extension 
alone is divisible.  It is how we know mind and body are really distinct.  Again, Descartes 
makes such claims in numerous texts, below are just a few examples: 
For example, the nature of a body includes divisibility along with extension space, 
and since divisibility is a imperfection, it is certain that God is not a body. 127 
As for the faculties of willing, of understanding, of sensory perception and so on, 
these cannot be termed parts of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that 
wills, and understands and has sensory perceptions.  By contrast, there is no corporal or 
extended thing that I can think of which in my thought I cannot easily divide into parts; and this 
very fact makes me understand that it is divisible.  This one argument would be enough to show 
me that the mind is completely different from the body, even if I did not already know as 
much from other considerations.128  
Remember that nothing has no properties, and that what is commonly called empty 
space is not nothing, but a real body deprived of all its accidents (i.e. all the things 
which can be present or absent without their possessor ceasing to be).  Anyone who 
has fully realized this, and who has observed how each part of this space or body differs from all 
others and is impenetrable, will easily see that no other thing can have the same divisibility, 
tangibility, and impenetrability. 129 
But how is it that numbers express the relations of order and measure among parts 
and wholes?  Let me attempt to give an account of how numbers and extension can be 
related through the part whole relationship as I’ve laid it out above.  In making this account 
of numbers or counting clearer, I think that it is important that I not saddle Descartes with a 
view that would have been implausible even by his own lights, but I also wish to render the 
view tenable even from our own contemporary point of view.  To this end, the following 
remarks are meant to both explicate how I understand Descartes’ views and also respond to 
                                                
127 Principles I: 23; AT VIIIA: 13; CSM I: 201. 
128 AT VII: 86; CSM II: 59. Emphasis mine. 
129 AT V: 401; CSMK: 381. Emphasis mine.  
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a contemporary philosopher who is wary of numbers entailing a composition relation as 
opposed to a mere non-identity relation.130 
In terms of the connection of number to extension, the central connection comes 
from the fact that the part/whole relation depends on the concept of divisibility, which is 
the essence or nature of extension.  Here, let me start of by clarifying that I think Descartes 
means to say that in thinking numerically, we must make use of a conceptual whole, with 
conceptual parts (not that the things we are thinking about numerically actually be a 
composite whole, metaphysically).  For example, when we count all the objects in a room, 
the whole being assumed is “all the objects in the room”.  Thus the things being counted, 
the pluralities, need not actually constitute some metaphysical whole: in fact, they may very 
well be decidedly not parts of a whole at all.  What I think Descartes means is that we 
conceive of there being some whole, total or sum that we regard as having within it all the 
divisions or distinctions that are the parts, elements, or members counted.   
So let us suppose you set out to count some things.  Which things are you going to 
count?  In giving any reply at all (e.g. blue cars, sheep, marbles, or that plurality), you will have 
done what Descartes would be claiming is to regard as a whole:  you will have picked out a 
single (whole) group that you wish to enumerate such that anything you do count is only 
counted in virtue of your thinking that it belongs in that group.  This is all that is meant by 
conceptualizing something as a whole.  The whole that gets assumed just is all the objects 
getting counted or measured.  Think of this as partitioning the world into two types: the 
things you are/will count and the things that you will not count. The partition determines all 
and only the things you are interested in: it individuates what you are interested in from the 
                                                
130 I have Laurie Paul to thank for her comments and discussion on this matter. 
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things you are not.  By doing this individuation, you would be thinking of the things you are 
interested in as if it were a single thing or collection.  This is why it is so crucial to the concept 
of numbers:  it is only in virtue of something being a part of that relevant partition that it gets counted.  If 
you did not think of it as a part of that whole (i.e. the group of things you are interested in) 
you would not count it. 
I think this makes good sense of the passage in Rule 14 on counts and measures.  
When a number is used to express a count, it functions like an ordinal: it expresses the order 
of the parts with respect to the whole series, or however far along the series you are at that 
moment.  That is to say, when you count your third marble as you throw it into your bucket, 
it depends on there also being a first marble and a second marble.  Otherwise, it wouldn’t be 
a third marble; it would have been marble, marble, marble.  When a number is used to 
express a measure, it functions like a cardinal: it expresses the whole as divided up into parts.  
If we were to measure our bucket of marbles, we would treat the total number of marbles as 
the whole and find that it is divisible into 3 unit-parts. What is most important is that in Rule 
14, he connects numbers with thinking about parts and wholes.  The condition that gives 
rise to number, be it a count or a measure, is the conception of things in terms of wholes 
and parts; vis, a conception that requires something divisible.  It is this that requires numbers 
to be connected with extension. 
But perhaps, still skeptical of this type of thinking, you think the notion of difference is 
what is really crucial to counting.  If you are going to count a plurality, one way you might 
identify that plurality would be to say, “I’m going to count this thing, and this thing, and this 
thing.”  But when you do that, crucially, what you are saying is that this thing is different 
from this thing, which is also different from this other thing.  And so the difference relation 
is doing most of the work. Perhaps you would be effectively creating (in a non-
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metaphysically loaded way) the relevant plurality or partition by identifying the various 
distinct things that you are going to count. Thus the notion of difference is what you are 
going to count by and it is also the thing that is underlying how you characterize the 
plurality. So the notion of parts and wholes I was talking about earlier is only playing some 
kind of secondary role: it’s rather otiose, because it is difference that is doing all the work.  
I think Descartes would agree that distinction or difference is what gets you 
numerical distinction (or the semantic condition that there is a multitude or number of 
things)—in fact I think he says as much in the Principles when he discusses real, rational and 
modal distinction.131 But I this is not what is at issue. The view about numbers that we are 
discussing is about the concept of the various numbers we have qua numeric quantity. So 
while the difference relation is what can get you numerical individuation, for Descartes it is 
not enough to get you particular numerical concepts like two.  Two is not the same concept as 
different.  For example, we would not count, “one, different, three,” but instead we count, 
“one, two, three”. 
What is at issue is how we must think of things numerically. Even if we grant that is 
only by using the notion of difference or distinction that we can tell there are multiple things 
out there in the world, this is not yet the same as being able to think the number of things 
are there. (The thought that x and y are different things is not yet to have the thought that x 
and y are two things.)  As for the priority of distinction, I think even though you start with 
only things that are different, when you go to count them you still have to partition them 
into the relevant group of distinct things that you mean to count which is to still think of 
them as a whole in the Cartesian sense. 
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As no other substance but extension is something that strictly speaking admits of 
conceiving in a parts/whole way.  If the dual function of numbers is to express the relations 
of order and measure among parts to wholes, then that severely limits numbers to 
expressions of various relationships that hold of only extension.  So strictly speaking ideas of 
number are ideas of extension, and no adequate counterexample the realist seeks can be 
generated for Descartes.  
But a question still remains, given that our ideas of numbers are ideas of extension 
how might Descartes explain how we count things that are not extended? 
4. Counting Indivisible Things By Analogy. 
The discussion the first and second condition of the Counting Problem above 
already suggests how my reading of Descartes would account for counting unextended 
things.  We count unextended things by analogy to extension.  That is, when consider 
unextended things as if they were extended.  We can do this by indexing them to (or 
representing them with) some extension.  The extension that we use to stand in their place 
allows us to think of the unextended things as if they had parts.  In this sense, any idea of a 
number still, strictly speaking, involves an idea of extension: either it is the extension of the 
extended things counted, or it is the extension used to represent the unextended things 
counted.  
Though Descartes does not directly address this counting per se, we can piece 
together how this can be done from a couple of different letters he wrote to More in which 
he describes the use of analogy.  For example:   
Now just as we can say that health belongs only to humans beings, though by 
analogy medicine and a temperate climate and many other things also are called 
74 
 
healthy, so too I call extended only what is imaginable as having parts within parts, each of 
determinate size and shape—although other things may be called extended by analogy.132  
Strictly speaking only what is imaginable as having parts within parts is what can 
properly be called extension, other things (unextended things) can be called extended by 
analogy.  What do this mean? Consider what Descartes writes in a letter to More about 
God’s extension.  Descartes writes that: 
For my part, in God and angels and in our mind I understand there to be no 
extension of substance, but only extension of power.  An angel can exercise power 
now on a greater and now a lesser part of corporeal substance; but if there were no 
bodies, I could not conceive of any space with which an angel or God would be co-
extensive.133  
And then a little bit later he writes that,  
You seem here to make God’s infinity consist in his existing everywhere, which is 
an opinion I cannot agree with.  I think that God is everywhere in virtue of his 
power; yet in virtue of his essence he has no relation to place at all.”134  
So while Descartes is very clear that metaphysically speaking God is not extended, 
we can think about God’s power as being extended by thinking about the parts within parts 
of the extended word as being places on which God’s power can act.  This is a way in which 
we may think of God as extended by analogy.  God is not extended: his essence has nothing 
to do with extension.  However, we can think about God in extended ways by thinking of 
the extension itself as representing, in this case, the power of God.  Since “in God there is 
no distinction between essence and power,”135 this is to think the essence of God through 
this extension.  In the letter, Descartes is warning More against confusing ideas of God’s 
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extension of power with the nature of God himself, but for my purposes, it shows nicely 
how, despite the dangers of confusing people like More, unextended things are thought of as 
extended by analogy.  There are other examples of this type of discussion in Descartes’ 
letters to More136, but this appeal to analogy also appears in Descartes’ discussions with other 
people.  For example in a case reported by Burman in which Descartes makes similar claims 
about God being extended, thought his time in terms of his duration: 
Thought will be extended and divisible with respect to its duration, since duration 
can be divided into parts.  But it is not extended and divisible with respect to its 
nature, since its nature remains unextended.  It is just the same with God: we can 
divide his duration into an infinite number of parts, even though God himself is 
not therefore divisible…137  
There, Descartes indicates that it is because duration is divisible into parts that allows 
for thought and God to be extended, though neither are extended by their nature. 
These passages show that while something may not be extended with respect to its 
nature, we can nonetheless think of them as extended by analogy and thereby consider the 
unextended things as if it were divisible or having parts within parts.  By doing so, we can 
                                                
136 “Nothing of this kind can be said about God or about our mind; they cannot be 
apprehended by the imagination, but only by the intellect; nor can they be distinguished into 
parts, and certainly not into parts which have determinate sizes and shapes.  Again we easily 
understand that the human mind and God and several angels can be at the same time in one 
and the same place.  So we clearly conclude that no incorporeal substances are in any strict 
sense extended.  I conceive them as sorts of powers or forces, which although they can act 
upon extended things, are not themselves extended...” (AT V: 270; CSMK: 361.) 
“I have already replied to what follows by observing that the extension which is attributed to 
incorporeal things is an extension of power and not of substance.  Such a power, being only 
a mode in the thing to which it is applied, could not be understood to be extended once the 
extended thing corresponding to it is taken away.” (AT V: 343; CSMK: 373.)  
“Moreover my mind cannot be more of less extended or concentrated in relation to place, in 
virtue of its substance, but only in virtue of its power, which it can apply to larger or smaller 
bodies… “ (AT V: 347; CSMK: 375.) 
137 AT V: 148-9: CSMK: 335. 
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think of non-extended things as having parts and being divisible through its representative.  
Once we consider the relationship of the parts to the whole, we can understand the non-
extended things in terms of its number (i.e. count or measure).   
With this in hand, now let us revisit the attempt to find an appropriate example that 
will generate the counting dilemma, and see how this view I have just sketched out can be 
applied 
5. Counting Problems Accounted. 
All of the attempted counting problem examples can be handled the same way for it 
does not matter what it is that anyone is counting, even if the things being counted are not 
extended.  It will be true in all cases that we understand the things numerically though ideas 
of extension, even in the realist’s cases when she attempts to count unextended things.  If 
she wants to understand the idea of a quantity of something, she has to understand it in 
some sort of part to whole relation.  But this relation is just what it means to understand 
something as divisible: that it can have parts.  Extension is the only substance that is 
divisible.  So in all other cases, when the things we are counting are not divisible according 
to their own nature, if we are to think of them in terms of a count or measure, we must 
represent them as extended things and use the division of the extended representations to 
assist us.   
In the case of money, what we think of as the value of the money that can be 
measured in terms of Euros or dollars as the whole (let us represent it as a line).  To think of 
the value in terms of dollars is to think of the line as divided into segments of one size; and 
to think of the value in terms of Euros is to think of the line as divided up into segments of 
a different size.  Alternatively, we can start with some particular sized segments and think 
about how many of them have been concatenated together to form the particular line.  This 
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would be like asking how many dollars comprise or make up the whole monetary value we 
are interested in. 
The same application of the basic ideas applies to all the other cases.  If we want to 
count the number of minds in the room, we think of how many parts are in the whole, the 
collection of the parts.  And, again, the whole being assumed is all the minds in the room. 
For example: We can think of the minds in the room as being a jar of marbles, and each 
mind being a marble that we will need to count.  But just like the money case, we can also 
use the line as the total or whole of all the minds, and some particular lengthed line segments 
as the parts that represent a mind.  In the case of time or duration, again for simplicity’s sake, 
we can think of the whole duration as a line and measure it according to some particular 
lengthed line segment that represents a unit or part of time.   To count sounds, we can 
consider the whole tune or song a line, and think of each note in the sequence as a segment 
that is part of the line.  There is always part/whole relationship (a relation of order or 
measure) involved in understanding things in terms of quantities. 
So too, when we consider the things we think of in a single idea like “I am distinct 
from God”.  We think of the idea as a whole, and when we want to individuate things within 
it, even though the idea is not extended, we have to think of the idea as extended in order to 
understand it as divisible into parts.  Understanding that the idea contains two different 
substances is to think that some whole, like a line, can be divided up into two parts, such as 
line segments.  One part represents one substance in the idea (God), and the other part 
represents the other substance in the idea (the thinker).  So while the idea itself is not 
extended and does not really have parts, we represent it as extended, or make it extended by 
analogy, and think if it as divisible through the divisibility of the extension we use to 
represent it to think about it as if it had parts.  Only then can we make sense of it as standing 
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in a part/whole relation that is necessary for thinking about in terms of a measure or count 
numbers.  So in every idea of a number of something, no matter what that something is, if 
we think of it numerically, it means we have included the idea of extension in order to 
mediate the part/whole idea of the non-extended thing to make sense of its number. 
 
6. Further Considerations: The Compendium Of Music 
On this nominalist account I have laid out, numbers are names of ideas.  These ideas 
are not abstract, general, innate ideas of universals.  Instead the ideas that signified by 
number-terms are all ideas that contain some idea of extension.  These ideas of extension are 
used to express a relationship between parts and wholes in one form or another: either in the 
form of a collection of discrete extended objects, or in the form of imaginary divisions in 
some continuous geometrical magnitude.  In either case, the division in to parts is necessary 
to generate a number because units for comparison are required.  Numbers are ideas that 
necessarily require an idea of extension.   
But why think this is a candidate account of Descartes’ views on the nature of 
numbers?  Aside from the various complications that would arise from adopting a realist 
reading of Descartes, consider one of his more striking claims: 
One thing can of course be said to be more or less white than another, one sound 
more or less sharp than another, and so on; but we cannot determine exactly 
whether the greater exceed the lesser by a ratio of 2 to 1 or 3 to 1 unless we have 
recourse to a certain analogy with the extension of a body that has shape.138  
One sound can be said to be more or less sharp than another.  But if we are to quantify how 
much sharper (that is, if we were to quantify the difference or measure it and put a number to 
it), we would have to use an analogy with extension.  The question then concerns what he 
                                                
138 AT X: 441; CSM I: 58.  
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means when he speaks of using an analogy to an extension of a body.  I submit that the 
answer to this question can be found in another early treatise, The Compendium of Music 
(Compendium)139.  There he makes remarks about how differences perceived by the senses are 
less when there is greater proportion between them, but importantly, this proportion must 
be arithmetic rather than geometric.140  The difference between the two types of proportions 
is then shown using two sets of line segments.  The one set of line segments illustrate 
geometrical comparisons.  The other set illustrate arithmetic comparisons.  The difference 
between the two sets of line segments is that in the arithmetic set, the line segments are 
divided into smaller parts (the divisions are marked out with contain hash marks) that allow 
one to say “that AB consists of two parts, whereas BC consists of three”.  It is only in 
relation to an arithmetic proportion that this can be properly perceived.  Otherwise, AB and 
BC are “incommensurable”.141   
 There are many reasons to think that Descartes thought of numbers as ideas of 
extension, or more specifically, as ideas of the relations that hold between extended objects.  
In these last two chapters I have presented a few metaphysical and epistemological 
considerations and offered some texts from the Rules and Compendium that have been 
previously neglected by the literature to motivate this position.  Next, I will offer some 
motivations for adopting this reading of Descartes that arise from a philosophical account of 
the relationship between algebra and geometry based on Descartes’ general mathematical 
views and practices. 
                                                
139 I use Walter Robert’s translation of Descartes’ Compendium of Music, or Compendium Musicae.  
Latin text may be found in AT X. 
140 Compendium, page 12. 
141 Ibid. 
   
 
Chapter 4 Unif ication and Priority in Descartes’  Algebra & 
Geometry 
0. Features Of Descartes’ Mathematical Practices  
There is a question about how we ought to understand how Descartes’ algebra and 
geometry fit together.  There are two distinctive features of his thinking about mathematics: 
on the one hand, he thinks that the equations of algebra and the figures of geometry can be 
translated each into the other—this is what I call the uni f i cat ion  of algebra and geometry.  
On the other hand, Descartes’ mathematical practices are consistently focused on geometry, 
and it is only in the service of finding geometrical solutions that he makes use of algebraic 
equations—this is what I call the prior i ty  of geometry.   
Two types of interpretations of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics have generally 
been offered:  I’ll call them the Traditionalist and Progressivist readings.   Tradit ional is t  
readings focus on the priority of geometry and understand Descartes’ mathematics in terms 
of the classical tradition he inherited—one that focused on geometrical constructions.  
Algebra, on this account, was merely a convenient way to find solutions for his real focus: 
the classical geometrical problems.  Progress iv is t  readings focus less on the influence of the 
historical tradition, and focus more on Descartes’ contributions towards our current 
mathematical conceptions.  While Traditionalists hold that Descartes thinks geometry is 
prior to algebra, the Progressivists give an explanation of how Descartes was able to justify 
the unification of algebra and geometry by denying geometry any real priority.  These 
accounts see Descartes as having taken a large step towards our current, pure mathematics 
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by separating the concepts of multitudes and magnitudes.  This is achieved by his adoption 
of abstract algebraic entities that allow for, but are independent of, geometrical 
instantiations.   
I argue that both these interpretive strategies involve important mistakes.  In this 
paper I offer an alternative account of how Descartes conceived the relationship between 
algebra and geometry that will better explain both features of his mathematical practices: 
unification and priority.  I argue that his philosophy of mathematics is better interpreted 
when we take into consideration his fundamental views about metaphysics and 
epistemology.  On the one hand, I argue that Descartes’ unification of algebra and geometry 
should be understood in a strong, metaphysical sense.  His unification is based on the 
metaphysical unity of the subject matter of both algebra and geometry.  For Descartes, thoughts 
about algebra and thoughts about geometry are both thoughts about one and the same 
metaphysical nature, viz. extension, the essence of matter.  On the other hand, his 
epistemological views will explain the priority he accorded to geometry.  Though Descartes 
thinks that the subject matter of algebra is the same as the subject matter of geometry, 
geometry represents that subject matter in a way that is more fundamental.  Algebraic 
conceptions, for Descartes, depend metaphysically and epistemologically on geometrical 
conceptions.  This, I argue, is why there is a priority of geometry.  
I proceed as follows.  In the first half of the paper I explain in more detail the two 
distinctive features of Descartes’ mathematics: unity and priority, (§1); and I then explain the 
two different interpretations of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics that have been 
offered, the Traditionalist and Progressivist readings (§2).  The Traditionalist has some way 
of accounting for priority but not for unity; the Progressivist has something to say about 
unity but little about priority.  And so a third reading is needed.  In the Second half of the 
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paper I argue for my third reading, and explain both unity and priority using the connections 
between Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics and his fundamental metaphysics and 
epistemology. 
1. Unity And Priority: The Interpretive Challenge 
While Descartes was an important figure in the unification of algebra with geometry, 
his mathematical practices did not resemble what we identify today as analytic geometry.  
For example, Descartes did not use what we today call Cartesian coordinates for he did not 
understand negative and positive numbers in terms of opposing directions from a designated 
origin.142  He thought of negative quantities as “less than nothing,” or as “false”.143  And yet, 
at the same time, he was making innovations in algebraic theory in order to bring those 
algebraic methods to bear on classical geometrical problems.  Descartes was deeply 
concerned with the nature of the relationship between the numbers and their algebraic 
expressions144 (multitudes) and the continuous figures of geometry (magnitudes).  His efforts 
to address this concern led him to formulate some of his most important mathematical 
innovations. His contributions that led to the development of analytic geometry are found in 
his re-conceptions of arithmetical operations that allowed for their generalized use for 
solving traditional geometrical problems.  That is, he gave algebraic methods acceptable 
geometrical interpretations, thereby legitimating their use for solving geometrical 
                                                
142 This innovative and essential conceptual leap for mathematics did not occur until 1685 
and was made by John Wallis in his work, Algebra. 
143 Cf. Book 3 of Descartes’ Geometry. 
144 In algebra, ranges of values for variables are numbers, or vectors of numbers, and they are 
not the same as the figures of geometry.  Since this is the relevant distinction I am aiming to 
emphasize, for the purposes of the paper, I will treat algebra as a generalized form of 
arithmetic, though there is some controversy and little agreement as to whether or not the 
early modern philosophers conceived of it this way. 
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problems.145  Descartes’ mathematical practices and philosophy of mathematics, in this 
respect, are curious; they simultaneously justify the unification of algebra with geometry on 
philosophical grounds while maintaining a distinctive focus on geometry.  
The priority of geometry to algebra, and the unification of geometry with algebra poses 
an interpretative challenge for Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics.  To better understand 
the challenge, it will help to briefly review a few points from the history of mathematics, and 
then compare Descartes with two of his contemporaries: Thomas Hobbes and Pierre 
Fermat. 
Mathematics was not always the abstract146, unified science that it is today.147  In its 
earliest stages, before it underwent its many transformations, mathematics was divided into 
geometry and algebra.  Geometry has a long history and tradition, but in its earliest stages it 
was merely a method or technique for measuring parcels of land: literally a geo-metry.  
Geometry dealt with continuous (geometrical) magnitudes like lines, perimeters, surfaces, 
and solids, as opposed to discrete multitudes that referred to the number of objects in a 
collection.  For geometers like Euclid, multitudes and magnitudes were different in kind.  
For instance, Euclid never multiplied two magnitudes together.148  Instead, to handle 
                                                
145 For more detailed discussion of this, see Bos (2000); Mancosu (1999).  
146 Certainly mathematics that are neither beholden to nor grounded on the actual physical 
world (e.g., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory) would have been considered too abstract and 
unintelligible by many early mathematicians.  
147 Even as late as the 17th century, British surveyors referred to themselves as ‘geometers’ in 
the original sense of the word.  They measured the Earth by angle as well as distance, 
intentionally setting themselves apart from mere “mathematicians’.  It was thus that 
mathematicians were thought to have a lower status than that of the geometers, a 
convention that persisted for two more centuries. Cf. Grattan-Guiness (1997), p. 196. 
148 For example, in Book 1, Proposition 46 of the Elements, when Euclid described the 
square on the line AB, he proved that the construction yields a defined square, not that the 
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magnitudes, Euclid used ratios.  Again, let me emphasize that a ratio such as 1:3 was, for 
Euclid, different in kind from the unit fraction 1/3.149  For Euclid and the geometers that 
followed him for hundreds of years, numbers and magnitudes were different types of 
quantity, each with their own distinct discipline: arithmetic dealt with the discrete and 
geometry with the continuous.  While geometers were less conservative as time went on, 
going so far as to multiply two, even three, magnitudes together (e.g., a × a, or a2, as a 
“square” of a, or a × a × a, or a3, as a “cube” of a) these arithmetic operations on magnitudes 
always resulted in another magnitude, and multiplying four magnitudes together was 
considered problematic.  Algebra was not considered an acceptable method for solving 
geometrical problems.   
Algebra had its own history and tradition going at least as far back as the ninth 
century when al-Khwarizmi introduced his method of solving polynomials in his book on 
equations.  While some developed algebra for geometry in the early modern period, 150 
others, such as Hobbes, opposed the use of the new methods for solving the geometrical 
problems from the classical tradition.  One reason Hobbes opposed using algebraic 
techniques was due to the then common belief that the objects and relations of geometry are 
the true and sole subjects of mathematics.  Algebraic expressions and solutions needed to be 
translated into their geometrical counterparts; but this presented many problems.  How are 
                                                                                                                                            
area is AB × AB, i.e., the square on the side is not the side squared: it is a region, and Euclid 
was not concerned with its area. 
149 One would never find in Euclid an equation such as a × d  = b × c, but instead the 
proportion a:b :: c:d . 
150 Cf. Molland, (1979).  Also see Klein (1968) for a discussion about the influence of 
François Viète’s work on Descartes and Fermat regarding this matter. 
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we to understand a negative magnitude, much less complex numbers? Furthermore, how are 
we to make geometrical sense of the sum of a cube and a square (i.e., x3 + x2)?   
Yet Descartes, unlike Hobbes, did not object to the use of algebra with geometry. 
Descartes did not think discrete multitudes were so different from continuous magnitudes 
that the latter couldn’t also be multiplied.  He didn’t think multiplying four magnitudes 
together resulted in dimensionality problems.  Instead, he unified algebra and geometry by 
connecting multitudes with magnitudes. This is what a unification of algebra and geometry 
required.  
On the other hand, many commentators have observed that Descartes lets essentially 
geometrical problems dictate and constrain his algebraic practices.  In fact, Descartes never 
introduces geometrical objects (such as curves) using their algebraic equations.  Curves are 
always first geometrically defined.  Equations are only subsequently derived from the given 
figures and are representations of relevant geometrical relations.  Scholars, thus, have 
observed that Descartes uses algebraic methods only to find solutions to geometrical 
problems.  As Henk Bos notes, “it appears that Descartes was not interested in algebra for 
its own sake.”151  Descartes’ “creation and adoption of algebraic analysis,” is described by 
Bos to be merely “a tool for geometry”152: and is what Ivor Grattan-Guinness describes as a 
“handmaiden”153 to Descartes’ geometrical pursuits.  According to Emily Grosholz, 
Descartes was “supplying the field of geometry with the computational device of algebra”, 
not “unifying two fields”.154  These are only a few examples.155  Descartes’ development of 
                                                
151 Bos (2001) 386-387. 
152 Bos (2001) 259. 
153 Grattan-Guiness (1998) 729. 
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analytic geometry is often contrasted with that of Fermat’s complementary development and 
emphasis on algebra.  Whereas Fermat works with algebraic equations and assumes the 
geometrical objects corresponding to them exist, Descartes starts, first, with geometrical 
objects, and seeks their equations second—and only as needed.  This is what I am calling the 
“priority” of geometry over algebra, for Descartes.   
Accounting both for unity and for priority is the interpretive challenge that current 
interpretations of Descartes do not adequately meet, or so I argue.  In the next section I 
characterize both the Traditionalist and Progressivist accounts according to their explanatory 
focus and explain how they conceive Descartes’ unity and priority. 
2. Traditionalist And Progressivist Readings Of Descartes 
If Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics and his mathematical practices are the 
explanandum, the Tradit ional is t  reading of Descartes appeals to the classical views about 
magnitude and geometry as the explanans.  According to Tradit ional is t  readings, as I 
characterize them, Descartes’ geometrical emphasis results from an acceptance of the 
Aristotelian tradition of mathematics.  This type of appeal can be found in various discussion 
of Descartes’ mathematics.  For example, Bos156 maintains that, “[t]he starting point of 
                                                                                                                                            
154 Grosholz (1980), 159. 
155 Further details can be found in Grattan-Guinness (1998), 225; Grosholz (1980), 160; Bos 
(2001), 383; and Boyer (2004), 101. 
156 I only aim to broadly characterize a strategy in the literature that shares this general 
feature of appealing to the traditional cannon of construction.  Bos’ full account of 
Descartes includes many subtle details that I do not have the space to explain in detail here.  
Bos does have much to say about Cartesian mathematical practices in terms of what he 
identifies as philosophical issues with which Descartes was concerned.  But Bos appeals to 
the classical tradition to explain these issues instead of grounding them in any of Descartes’ 
systematic, philosophical views.  I think a better explanation can be found within Descartes’ 
metaphysical and epistemological views. 
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[Descartes’] interpretation of exactness was classical Greek geometry; geometrical problem 
solving meant construction by intersection of curves and his classification of problems can 
be seen as a modification of Pappus’ ”157 and “[w]e may therefore characterize Descartes’ 
algebra as subservient to geometry, more precisely to the canon of construction that Descartes 
elaborated in order to solve ‘all the problems of geometry’.”158  These accounts of Descartes’ 
mathematical practices seem to suggest that he has no philosophically principled reason for 
the subservient role he assigns to algebra. Carl Boyer offers a strong view of this sort:  
Some attention has been given to the status of analytic geometry vis-à-vis other 
branches of mathematics; but the impact of the wider intellectual milieu has been 
referred to only where it was regarded as of particular significance. It is of interest 
to note in this connection that the development of coordinate geometry was not to 
any great extent bound up with general philosophical problems. The discoveries of 
Descartes and Fermat in particular are relatively free of any metaphysical 
background. Indeed, La Géométrie was in many respects an isolated episode in the 
career of Descartes – one suggested by a classical problem of Greek geometry.159  
In short, Boyer denies the very plausibility of any such philosophical explanation. This 
is unexpected: given what Boyer describes as Descartes’ otherwise “iconoclastic attitude”160, 
why does he not transcend the classical tradition, but instead maintain a devotion to, as 
Grosholz puts it, “the classical canon of problems and its emphasis on 
constructability”161,162?  Such Traditionalist accounts have a difficult time explaining what led 
                                                
157 Bos (2001) 285. 
158 Bos (2001) 387, emphasis added. 
159 Boyer (2004) viii. 
160 Boyer (2004) 84. 
161 Grosholz (1980) 161. 
162 See also Grattan-Guinness (1998) 223; and Boyer (2004) 83,100. 
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Descartes to use algebraic techniques to solve geometrical problems, and why he regarded 
himself as justified in so doing.   
In other words, while the Traditionalists can offer an explanation for the priority of 
geometry in Descartes’ thinking by appealing to an acceptance of the classical tradition, their 
historical focus does not offer an explanation for why Descartes was able to justify the use 
of algebra for geometry, i.e., the unification of algebra and geometry.  The classical tradition to 
which the Traditionalists appeal is one that would have motivated Descartes to avoid the use 
of algebraic methods.163  Explaining the priority of geometry in Descartes in terms of the 
classical cannon does not explain why he did not, instead, share the views of Hobbes.  The 
difficult task a Traditionalist strategy faces, if it is to be retained, is explaining why Descartes 
rejects some of the traditional conceptions of mathematics but not others.  But such an 
explanation most likely will not be based on the Traditionalist’s appeal to the classical canon.  
Traditionalist readings offer an account of priority at the expense of an adequate account of 
his unification. 
In opposition, a Progress iv is t  reading takes Descartes to have posited the existence 
of pure, abstract numbers in order to justify the unification of algebra and geometry.  This 
interpretive strategy understands Descartes as taking the first fundamental steps in 
developing a pure mathematics by allowing for the existence of truly abstract mathematical 
                                                
163 Many commentators have explained how Descartes was able to geometrically reinterpret 
arithmetical operations, and thus explain how Descartes is able to make quantities 
dimensionally homogenous. [Again, cf. Bos (2000); Mancosu (1999) for thorough 
explanations.]  This, by itself, it not an explanation for why he was justified in unifying the 
algebraic methods with geometry in the way he does.  More conservative thinkers of the 
time found algebraic methods, in general, to be suspect.  There was no denying the 
usefulness of algebraic techniques, but Descartes was not merely unifying the methods for 
use by craftsmen where effective approximations would be sufficient.  Instead, he makes the 
unification legitimate as a method for knowledge—which must be indubitable (cf. Rule 2 of the 
Rules). 
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objects that are not necessarily physically grounded.  Progressivists think Descartes’ 
philosophy about the nature of abstraction allowed him to jettison the need to ground 
abstract ideas like numbers and quantities in extension.  And it is through this “spatial 
liberation” that Descartes makes great progress in our journey to the pure mathematics we 
have today.   
The Progressivist reading champions how novel Descartes’ mathematical approach 
was with respect to the classical canon; thus, the account doesn’t offer a reason for why 
Descartes would accord geometry any priority so much as it deemphasizes any geometrical 
priority and any need for such a priority on Descartes’ part.  Various interpretations of 
Descartes’ mathematics focus on this distinction between abstract numbers and continuous, 
geometric magnitudes.164  For example, in Descartes’ work Mahoney finds that “for the first 
time there appear new, purely abstract, non-intuitive objects in mathematics, which arise out 
of structural considerations.  Descartes also frees the concept of number from its classical 
intuitive foundations.”165   Schouls characterizes Descartes’ algebraic entities and their 
relations as “free from the constraints of sense or corporeal imagination.”166 Gaukroger 
considers Descartes to have inaugurated what he takes to be “the first stage in the 
development of algebra, namely the freeing of number from spatial intuitions.”167  He argues 
                                                
164 Ernst Cassirer is one of the first Progressivists: cf. chapter 3 of his Substance and Function. 
165 Mahoney (1980) 146. 
166 Schouls (2000) 122. 
167 Gaukroger (1992) 112. 
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that in denying the necessity of a spatial conception of numbers, Descartes had taken a 
significant step away from the Aristotelian “metric geometry”.168  
According to Progressivists, Descartes maintains that even though ideas like 
“extension”, “body” and “number” are inseparable in our imagination, they have distinct 
meanings and are understood separately by the intellect.169  The intellect separates these ideas 
by abstraction; “number” and “extension” are understood by the intellect as having different 
content.  And “[t]he proper objects of the intellect,” along this type of reading, “are 
completely abstract entities and are free of images or ‘bodily representations’.”170  Thus 
mathematical entities are conceived independently of any determinate entities that can 
represent them.  Gaukroger explains that “the objects of [algebra], insofar as these are 
conceived in the intellect, are indeterminate.”171  By indeterminate, he means that a concept, 
like “fiveness” is not conceived in terms of any particular instance of five things.  The 
indeterminate content of algebraic objects in the intellect such as “fiveness” is understood by 
the intellect “as something separate from five objects (or line segments, or points, or 
whatever)”.172  Only in the imagination is a general magnitude like “fiveness” made specific 
and determinate by the five objects, whatever they are, we imagine.173  But in the intellect, we 
                                                
168 Gaukroger (1992) 100-103. 
169 Gaukroger (1992) 109. 
170 Gaukroger (1992) 110, 
171 Gaukroger (1980) 109. 
172 Gaukroger (1992) 110. 
173 Gaukroger (1992) 110. 
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conceived of fiveness independently of any particular spatial determination, or any spatial 
determination at all, for that matter. 
In this way, Progressivist readings, such as Gaukroger’s, take Descartes to have freed 
numbers from spatial intuitions.174  The abstract numerical entities of algebra can, by our 
imagination, “be represented geometrically, i.e. purely in terms of spatial extension”175.  But 
insofar as the intellect understands an algebraic abstraction, it isn’t as an idea of extension.176  
The indeterminate, abstract entities of algebra—numbers free from the constraints of spatial 
intuitions—are, for Gaukroger and other Progressivist readings, what so sharply separates 
Descartes from the Greek tradition.177  Descartes departs from the classical tradition when 
he allows for the intellect to understand the meaning of abstract algebraic entities (such as 
“fiveness”) as something separate from the extended, determinate way we imagine five 
things. On this account, Descartes doesn’t collapse the distinction between multitudes and magnitudes so 
much as he makes the discrete quantity, the multitude, prior to magnitudes.178  Various geometrical 
                                                
174 On this point Gaukroger is not alone, cf. Mahoney, Schouls. 
175 Gaukroger (1992) 110. 
176 Patrick Suppes also takes a Progressivist reading of Descartes in this respect.  He writes, 
“A claimed reduction much closer to the formal spirit promoted here and one of great 
importance in the history of ideas is Descartes’ reduction of geometry to algebra.” Suppes (2002) 
page 52: emphasis mine. 
177 “One of the central features of Descartes’ algebra is that it deals with magnitudes, or 
‘proportions’, in general.  Above everything, this serves to distinguish it from Greek 
mathematics.  In the Aristotelian tradition, there are only numbers of things, geometric 
magnitudes, periods of time etc., that is, specific kinds of quantity of specific kinds of 
things.” Gaukroger (1980) 103. 
178 Progressivist readings of Descartes require that he subscribed to some version of Realism 
(either Strong or Weak) about universals such as numbers.  See Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation.  I call consider all readings that give some sort of independence or priority to 
numbers “Realist” readings.  Strong Realism differs from Weak Realism in terms of the 
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magnitudes are just one of many determinations of a more fundamental (and abstract) 
object, the number.179   
But just as the Traditionalist readings struggle to account for the difference between 
Descartes and Hobbes, the Progressivist cannot account for the difference between 
Descartes and Fermat.  While the Progressivists can offer an explanation for Descartes’ 
unification of algebra and geometry by appealing to the indeterminate nature of algebraic 
abstractions, their focus does not offer an explanation for why Descartes was focused on the 
geometry: why he would use algebraic techniques only after he was first able to geometrically 
characterize an object.  A Progressivist reading of Descartes would have to deny any real 
meaningful priority of geometry in Descartes’ mathematics.  With the existence of abstract 
numeric entities, multitudes are distinct from magnitudes and there is no reason that 
Descartes could not have developed his mathematics in the same way his contemporary, 
Fermat, had done.  The difficult task a Progressivist reading faces is explaining why 
Descartes’ mathematics did not in fact resemble Fermat’s; and why Descartes focused 
overwhelmingly on the geometrical aspect of the unification of algebra and geometry.  Any 
such explanation offered by a Progressivist reading will most likely not be based on their 
appeal to Descartes’ creation of algebraic abstractions.  Progressivist readings offer an 
account for unity at the expense of an adequate account of priority. 
Neither the Traditionalist nor the Progressivist readings provide the best account of 
Descartes’ mathematical views. Neither adequately accounts for both unity and priority.  
                                                                                                                                            
ontological status of numbers.  For example, a Platonist about numbers would be considered 
a Strong Realism, while a conceptualism about numbers would be a Weak Realism. 
179 There are many interpretive problems with Realist readings of Descartes that are also 
additional problems for Progressivist readings.  For arguments against Realist readings, see 
Chapter 2. 
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Instead, I offer a better interpretation of Descartes that will explain both unity and priority.  
My interpretation will also explain why it would be a mistake to take a Traditionalist or 
Progressivist approach to understanding Descartes philosophy of mathematics.  Taking the 
issues in reverse, I argue, pace Progressivist accounts, that Descartes does not free numbers 
from spatial intuitions.  Descartes’ philosophical views regarding the conception of quantity 
and the nature of abstract ideas do not countenance the pure, abstract, mathematical objects 
required for the Progressivist understanding of Descartes.  It is not that “algebraic entities 
can be represented geometrically”180. Rather, I argue that according to Descartes they must be 
represented geometrically.  To show this, I explain what Descartes takes to be the 
relationship between algebra and geometry.  This reading, based largely on the 
methodological considerations given in an early, unpublished manuscript, the Regulae ad 
Directionem Ingenii, will offer an “internal” and systematic account for his subordinating of 
algebra to geometry.  Hence, pace Boyer and the Traditionalist understanding of his 
philosophy of mathematics, Descartes was not merely following in the classical tradition 
either.  On my account, Descartes’ mathematical practices are a consequence of his 
metaphysical and epistemological views concerning the nature of mathematics—ones that 
are themselves grounded in his methodological considerations.  Extension, the shared nature 
of the objects of both algebra and geometry, accounts for their metaphysical identity—
justifying their unification.  But the relative ordering and deductive distance from that shared 
absolute nature accounts for the priority Descartes places on the geometry.  Thus, it would 
be a mistake to think that Descartes’ mathematical views are orthogonal to his philosophical 
views.  My reading, which starts with considerations from Descartes’ stated Method, can 
                                                
180 Gaukroger (1992) 110: emphasis mine. 
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comfortably account for both the priority of geometry while explaining its unification with 
algebra. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. I briefly explain why our 
investigation of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics should be viewed through his 
philosophical Method as presented in the Rules.  After I present the rudiments of Descartes’ 
Method, I then turn (§4) to his views regarding the general enterprise of mathematics as 
given in the Rules. There we see that there is no real (metaphysical) distinction between the 
objects or subject matter of geometry and algebra.  Such a view rules out any possibility of 
the “numeric-liberation” espoused by a Progressivist reading, and instead offers a different 
explanation for how Descartes justified the unification of algebra and geometry. Then (§5) I 
argue that despite the metaphysical identity between objects of geometry and algebra, 
geometry is in an epistemic sense more fundamental than algebra.  It is this epistemic 
priority of geometry that grounds the geometrical emphasis in his mathematical practices.  
This, I suggest, strongly undermines the Traditionalists readings that see Descartes’ 
mathematical views as merely a product of his time.  Finally (§6) I summarize and briefly 
conclude. 
3. Through Descartes’ Eyes: Using His Method As A Lens 
As mentioned above, Descartes’ contributions to the development of analytic 
geometry are both lasting and integral.  Given the esteem with which we hold Descartes’ 
mathematical achievements, it may be perplexing that in Descartes’ writings he is rather 
dismissive of mathematics.  For example, he writes in the Rules that he  
would not value these Rules so highly if they were good only for solving those 
pointless problems with which arithmeticians and geometers are inclined to while 
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away their time, for in that case, all I could credit myself with achieving would be to 
dabble in trifles with greater subtlety than they.181 
And that, “there is really nothing more futile than so busying ourselves with bare numbers 
and imaginary figures that we seem to rest content in the knowledge of such trifles.”182 
The Rules to which Descartes refers above are the rules that explain his Method for 
the investigation of the truth in all things.  Descartes goes on to explain that the Method he 
developed (his universal mathematics) was the result of first his study of arithmetic, and 
geometry; and then a more general investigation of mathematics.  What he discovered led 
him to resolve in his search for the knowledge of things, “to adhere unswervingly to a 
definite order, always starting with the simplest and easiest things and never going beyond 
them till there seems to be nothing further which is worth achieving where they are 
concerned.”183   
Before I briefly summarize Descartes’ universal mathematics, let me first review 
some of the relevant machinery central to the Method.  According to Descartes, the contents 
of our minds can be divided into two types: simple natures, and things that are composed of 
simple natures.184  Simple natures are innate ideas that we can clearly and distinctly 
                                                
181 Rule 4; AT X: 373; CSM I: 17. 
182 Rule 4; AT X: 374; CSM I: 18. 
183 Rule 4; AT X: 379; CSM I: 20. 
184 “… it is not possible for us ever to understand anything beyond those simple natures and 
a certain mixture or compounding of one with another.  Indeed, it is often easier to attend at 
once to several mutually conjoined natures than to separate one of them from the others.” 
(Rule 12; AT X: 422; CSM I: 46) 
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perceive185 (or “intuit”, to use Descartes’ term in the Rules).186  There are not very many of 
these ideas: Descartes remarks that “there are very few pure and simple natures which we 
can intuit…”.187  The different simple natures (or different substances, or essences) can form 
various mixtures or compounds that can further combine to form yet more complex 
composites.  This compounding of simples in multiple iterations and patterns, according to 
Descartes, can account for all our other more complex ideas.188  Given his theory of ideas, 
“the whole of human knowledge consists uniquely in our achieving a distinct perception of 
how all these simple natures contribute to the composition of other things.”189  His entire 
                                                
185 “… we term ‘simple’ only those things which we know so clearly and distinctly that they 
cannot be divided by the mind into others which are more distinctly known…all the rest we 
conceive to be in a sense composed out of these [simples]” (Rule 12; AT X: 418; CSM I: 44). 
186 “... we need take no great pains to discover these simple natures, because they are self 
evident enough.  What requires effort is distinguishing one from another, and intuiting each 
one separately with steadfast mental gaze.”  (Rule 12; AT X: 425; CSM I: 48).    
And also: 
 “…we should note that there are very few pure and simple natures which we can intuit 
straight off and per se (independently of any others) either in our sensory experience or by 
means of a light innate within us.  We should, as I said, attend carefully to the simple natures 
which can be intuited in this way, for these are the ones which in each series we term simple 
in the highest degree. (Rule 6; AT X: 383; CSM I: 22). 
187 Rule 6; AT X: 383; CSM I: 22. 
188 “… it is not possible for us ever to understand anything beyond those simple natures and 
a certain mixture or compounding of one with another.  Indeed, it is often easier to attend at 
once to several mutually conjoined natures than to separate one of them from the others.” 
(Rule 12; AT X: 422; CSM I: 46). 
189 Rule 12; AT X: 427; CSM I: 49. 
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Method, as he conceived it, consists in ordering and arranging our ideas according to their 
degree of confusion or complexity.190 
In order to do this, we compare two objects to one another in order to determine 
their relative dependence.  The object or nature that is called “absolute” is that one that has 
the simpler nature of the two, and the other, the “relative” nature, shares (at least partially) 
that same nature.191  This comparing and ordering according to dependence and complexity 
is done repeatedly until a continuous series can be completed that connects the two 
extremes: the most complex with the most simple (which Descartes sometimes calls “simple 
in the highest degree”192, or “absolute in the highest degree”193).  This will allow us to 
“observe how all the rest [the more complicated] are more or less, or equally removed from 
the simplest.”194  But no matter how far removed from the simplest nature, any compound 
in the continuous series will share in that simple nature.  That is to say, it will have that 
                                                
190 “The whole method consists entirely in the ordering and arranging of the objects of 
which we must concentrate our mind’s eye if we are to discover some truth.  We shall be 
following this method exactly if we first reduce complicated and obscure propositions step 
by step to simpler ones, and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest ones of all, try to 
ascend through the same steps to a knowledge of all the rest.”  (Rule 5; AT X: 379; CSM I: 
20). 
191 “I call ‘absolute’ whatever has within in the pure and simple nature in question; that is, 
whatever is viewed as being independent, a cause, simple, …and other qualities of that 
sort… The ‘relative’, on the other hand, is what shares the same nature, or at least something 
of the same nature, in virtue of which we can relate it to the absolute and deduce it from the 
absolute in a definite series of steps.”  (Rule 6; AT X: 381-382; CSM I: 21) 
192 “We should, as I said, attend carefully to the simple natures which can be intuited in this 
way, for these are the ones which in each series we term simple in the highest degree.” (Rule 
6; AT X: 383; CSM I: 22). 
193 “The secret of this technique consists entirely in our attentively noting in all things what 
which is absolute in the highest degree.” (Rule 6; AT X: 382; CSM I: 22) 
194 Rule 6; AT X: 381; CSM I: 21.
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nature as a part of its complex, and will depend on that simple nature.  This Method of 
investigation (reducing a complex thing into its simplest nature) provides us with knowledge 
of what the true nature or essence of the thing is.  
Equipped with the understanding of Descartes’ Method as I have briefly 
summarized, we can better understand Descartes’ contributions to the development of 
analytic geometry. A true unification of the disciplines of algebra and geometry is ultimately grounded on 
the fact that the objects of algebra and the objects of geometry share an identical metaphysical nature.   My 
Method-based understanding of Descartes’ mathematics will offer an explanation of how he 
justified the unification of algebra and geometry in a way that was acceptable on his own 
philosophical grounds. It will also explain why his unification has its distinctive characteristic 
focus on geometry as by appeal to the dependence relation that the method picks out.  
4. Unification Through The Nature Of Mathematics  
In this section, I develop an account of Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics and 
his unification of algebra and geometry that is at odds with the Progressivist reading 
sketched above. In order to bring out this conflict (and, I suggest, Descartes’ true view), let 
me first step back and review a few key points from Descartes’ Rules insofar as they pertain 
to some very general views about mathematics.  Once we have done this, not only will we be 
in position to see the problem for the Progressivist account of the unification of algebra and 
geometry, but we will also have a better explanation for how Descartes was able to justify it.  
According to Descartes, all knowledge (mathematical or otherwise) results from “a 
comparison between two or more things” along, or with respect to, some common feature 
or nature. 195  Regarding mathematics in particular, Descartes writes that he, “came to see 
                                                
195 Rule 14; AT X: 440-441; CSM I: 57-58. 
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that the exclusive concern of mathematics is with questions of order and measure and that it is 
irrelevant whether the measure in question involves numbers, shapes, stars, sounds, or any 
other object whatever.”196  As terminology, a relation of order relates things directly to each 
other with respect to some shared “dimension” of comparison.  For example, we can know 
the relation of order between a line segment and a congruent line segment by comparing 
them side-by-side; or we could tell if a third line segment was longer than the other two put 
together if we concatenated the first two and compared it against the third.  In contrast, 
relations of measure require the mediation of an extra term: the specified unit of measure.  We 
cannot know the count or measure of a magnitude of extension unless we know the unit by 
which we are to compare them. E.g., we cannot know the number of an object’s height until 
we decide on a scale of measurement that, thereby, fixes the units.  The mediating unit of 
measure allows us to understand magnitudes of extensions either as counts or as measures.  
There is no real distinction between a count and a measure.  The two are merely rationally 
distinct.197   
Note here, in connection with the Method, the same two things can be compared or 
related in both ways: order and measure.  We can use a relation of order to compare two 
objects, A and B, along a shared nature, like that of length, directly to each other and 
                                                
196 Rule 4; AT X: 378; CSM I: 19: emphasis mine. 
197 See Rule 14; AT X: 448; CSM I: 62.  Counting and measuring are only rationally distinct. 
Counting consists in considering the order of the parts in relation to the whole. Measuring 
consists in considering a whole magnitude as something as divided into parts. When 
something is measured, it is counted when considered in the reverse direction. We can count 
the years in a century; or we can measure centuries in terms of years. It is the same magnitude 
we consider, first by attending to the order of the parts to the whole, then by attending to 
the measure of the whole in terms of its parts. The important point is that counting and 
measuring are different ways to view the same relationship between parts and wholes, i.e., 
different ways in which we can attend to the same thing. 
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determine that object A is longer than object B.  We can use a relation of measure to 
compare the same two objects and their lengths according to a shared unit of measure that 
we specify and determine that object A is longer than object B by x units.  In either case, the 
same two objects are being compared with respect to the same common nature, i.e., the 
dimension of length; however, the relation of measure is not considered to be as simple or as 
easily known as the relation of order because the objects are not directly related to one another 
but instead require the extra mediation of the unit of measure.  In this sense, the relation of 
measure is more complex relative to the relation of order.  Thus following Rule 6,198 the relation 
of order is prior to the relation of measure.   
In sum, mathematical knowledge results from comparisons of the order and measure 
of things with respect to a common nature.  Descartes’ Method for attaining this knowledge of 
the shared nature instructs us to reduce all the relevant relations and proportions among the 
things compared to some equality between what is sought and what is known.  That is, we 
find an equation to express what we want to know, based on the relationships of the 
equalities between what we do know.  To give an example, let me adapt a problem from 
Rule 6199: If we are given two extremes, 3 and 48, and were required to find the three missing 
means to complete the continued proportional (viz. 6, 12 and 24), we would could use the 
relations we do know (viz. 3 x 48 = y x y; 3 x y  = w x w; and y x 48 = z x z ) to produce the 
solutions (we would just solve for y, w, and z one by one).     
                                                
198 Rule 6; AT X: 381-387; CSM I: 21-24.  Rule 6 instructs us to arrange things serially 
according to what can be known on the basis of others, sorting out what can be 
apprehended only by deducing them from those which are simpler. 
199 Rule 6; AT X: 386; CSM I: 24.. 
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But, Descartes says, “nothing can be reduced to such equality except what admits of 
differences of degree, and everything covered by the term ‘magnitude’.”200  He continues on in Rule 14 to 
explain that our ideas of magnitudes are ideas of the real extensions of bodies: they are ideas 
of the same thing, i.e., the same, shared, identical nature.  For “it follows”, he writes, “from 
what we said in Rule Twelve that [magnitude in general] is the real extension of a body 
considered in abstraction from everything else about it save its having a shape.”201  Descartes 
then nicely summarizes that our mathematical knowledge consists solely in the discovery of 
“a certain extension on the basis of a comparison with some other extension which we 
already know.”202  We need to discern the magnitudes of extension as relations and 
proportions.  Being able to do so would show how the relations and proportions merely 
result from, and are known on the basis of, the simpler shared nature: the extension of 
bodies, i.e., geometrical magnitudes.  Fortunately, extension has three characteristics that 
help us do just this: dimension, unity, and figure.  I discuss these three characteristics in turn. 
By dimension, Descartes means “simply a mode or aspect in respect of which some 
subject is considered to be measurable.”203  This includes length, breadth and depth,204 but 
also other dimensions such as weight or speed.  Any mode that gives rise to number or 
measure is a species of dimension.  There can be, within the same object, many different 
                                                
200 Rule 14; AT X: 440-441; CSM I: 57-58: emphasis mine. 
201 Rule 14; AT X: 441; CSM I: 58. (By extension, Descartes means that which has length, 
breadth, and depth, but he does not mean to make a distinction between a body and a 
space.) 
202 Rule 14; AT X: 447; CSM I: 62. 
203 Rule 14; AT X: 447; CSM I: 62. 
204 Rule 14; AT X: 449; CSM I: 63. He notes that these are merely nominally different. 
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dimensions, and each one is not to be considered really distinct from the extended body or, 
therefore, from each other.  Though some geometers mistakenly think the line, plane, and 
solid are different species of quantity, Descartes reminds us that they are not really distinct 
from one another.  They are only rationally distinguished through the abstractions we make 
with our reason.  “Indeed,” he writes, “if they are thought of without respect to anything 
else, as abstractions of the intellect, then they are no more different species of quantity than 
‘animal’ and ‘living’ in man are different species of substances.”205  We do not think that 
there are two separate parts of man, one that is ‘animal’, and the other that is ‘living’.  
Instead, we view them as different ways in which we can regard a man.  Similarly, we can 
think of an extended object, like a book, and regard it in different ways.  If we regard the 
object qua volume, we may attend to the object as a rectangular prism.  If we regard the 
object qua surface area of a face, we may attend to the object as a rectangle.  Alternatively, if 
we regard the book qua length of an edge, we may attend to the object as a line segment.   In 
each case above we have successively further delimited our thought of the book.  But in all 
cases, we would be thinking of the book: sometimes as an object with volume, other times as 
an object with area, etc. In each instance, we are thinking of the same extended thing (the 
same magnitude of extension), though we are, in each instance, attending to it along a 
different dimension.  
The second characteristic of extension, unity, is “the common nature which, …, all the 
things which we are comparing must participate in equally.”206  So long as no unity is 
specified in the problem, we can take any magnitude, and use it as the unit of measure for all 
                                                
205 Rule 14; AT X: 448-449; CSM I: 63. 
206 Rule 14; AT X: 450; CSM I: 63, emphasis added. 
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other magnitudes.  It just needs to have as many dimensions as the most extreme term we’re 
comparing has.  Thus, if the most extreme magnitude sought has two dimensions, our 
common measure should have two.  Note that determining a common unit of measure 
already assumes that some common dimension(s) has been selected.  Only after we specify 
the dimension(s) of interest can we undertake the task of determining what a unit of that 
measure will be.  
The third characteristic of extension is shape, or figure.  When we are engaged in 
mathematics, only two types of figures are useful for comparing relations or proportions of 
multitudes and magnitudes: figures that represent sets, and figures that illustrate continuous 
magnitudes.207  Figures that represent sets or multitudes are discrete, like a collection of 
points or lines.  Figures that illustrate continuous magnitudes can include polyhedrons, 
polygons, lines, etc.  
These three features, dimension, unity, and figure, are not really distinct from 
extension, but are the ways that we can attend to the shared nature that allows for 
comparisons of extension to be made.  Even when extensive magnitudes seem at first 
incomparable, using the three features of extension, we can understand what relations and 
proportions hold among the different extended magnitudes.  As mathematics is exclusively 
concerned with order and measure, the features of dimension, unity and figure allow us to 
compare the extensive magnitudes in terms of these two relations.  
In Rule 14, Descartes warns against making the same mistakes that mathematicians 
make when they think that the magnitudes abstracted from objects in their thoughts are 
really distinct from the objects.  Sometimes arithmeticians “think that numbers are 
                                                
207 Rule 14; AT X: 450; CSM I: 64. 
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abstracted from every subject by means of the intellect and that they are even to be really 
distinguished (vere distinguendos) from every subject by means of the imagination.”208  
Geometers, Descartes continues, thinking, “lines have no breadth, surfaces no depth,” create 
a surface using the extended quality of the line, not realizing that they are all simply “mode[s] 
of body.209  When we are engaged with mathematical problems, we are concerned with an 
extended object that we think of solely in terms of its extensive magnitudes.  But we should 
not think that magnitudes are really distinct from the things that have the magnitudes (the 
real extension of a body).  It would be a mistake to think the things whose magnitude we are 
regarding are somehow excluded in our cognition of the magnitudes when considered 
generally in mathematics, as if they somehow had a separate existence—like in the case of 
the “animal” and the “living” in the man.  In short, Descartes takes pains, repeatedly, to 
emphasize that the magnitudes—or what admits of differences of degree210—are modes of 
attributes: mere rational distinctions of extended objects.  This is important to for him, in 
part because it is easy for us to be misled by an incorrect understanding of some of the 
crucial terms of the discussion, much as the geometers have been.  
In the same vein, Descartes warns that we should be careful to distinguish what ideas 
words like “extension” and “body” mean when conveyed to our intellect. His discussion of 
the sentence “Extension is not body” is particularly informative:  
In this sense there is no specific idea corresponding to [extension] in the 
imagination.  In fact this expression is entirely the work of the pure intellect: it 
                                                
208 Rule 14; AT X: 446; CSM I: 61. 
209 Rule 14; AT X: 446; CSM I: 61-62. 
210 Rule 14; AT X: 440; CSM I: 58: “We should note, moreover, that nothing can be reduced 
to such an equality except what admits of differences of degree, and everything covered by 
the term ‘magnitude’.”  
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alone has the ability to distinguish between abstract entities of this sort.  This is a 
source of error for many who, not realizing that extension taken in this sense 
cannot be grasped by the imagination, represent it by means of a real idea.  Now 
such an idea necessar i ly  involves the concept of body.  So if they say that extension 
so conceived is not body, they are unwittingly ensnared into saying ‘The same thing 
is at once body and not body.’211 
Descartes, here, clearly warns both against reifying the abstractions of the intellect, and 
against observing “distinctions” between ideas that cannot be separated in the imagination.  
It is, Descartes claims, “a source of error” to think that we have an idea of extension that 
does not include what necessarily is involved in the concept, i.e., its necessary nature.  
Descartes does not stop with just extension.  He continues: 
It is important to distinguish utterances in which such terms as ‘extension’, ‘shape’, 
‘number’, ‘surface’, ‘line’, ‘point’, ‘unity’, etc. are given such a narrow sense that they 
exclude something which is not really distinct from what they signify, as for 
example in the statements: ‘Extension or shape is not body’, ‘A number is not the thing 
numbered’ (numerus non est res numerata) … etc.212 
Just as extension is not really distinct from body, and it would be “a source of error” to think 
we have an idea of extension that does not include body; so too, number is not really distinct 
from the things numbered, and it would be a “source of error” to think we can have an idea 
of number that does not include what is “necessarily involved in the concept”, i.e., its 
necessary nature.  
All this leads to our first conclusion.  Crucially, in Rule 14, Descartes rules out the 
possibility of the existence of the Progressivist reading’s abstract numeric entities.  In fact, the 
Progressivist reading makes exactly the mistake Descartes warns against.  Descartes recommends that 
“the imagination nonetheless ought to form a real idea of the thing” when the intellect 
employs terms like “number” so as to prevent the intellect from excluding “the other 
                                                
211 Rule 14; AT X: 444-445; CSM I: 60: emphasis mine. 
212 Rule 14; AT X: 445; CSM I: 60: emphasis mine. 
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features of the thing which are not conveyed by the term in question, and so that it may 
never injudiciously take these features to be excluded.”213  Specifically, in the case of number, 
“we imagine some subject which is measurable in terms of a set of units” and though we can 
allow the intellect to confine “its attention to this set of units; nevertheless we must see to it 
that, in doing so, it does not draw a conclusion which implies that the thing numbered has 
been excluded from our conception.”214  We cannot have an abstract idea of “fiveness” that excludes 
any determinate representation of it.  Any attempt to conceive of a number that is not a thing 
numbered is one in which the term is “given such a narrow sense that [it] exclude[s] 
something which is not really distinct from what [it] signif[ies].”215  We would thus be 
ensnared into saying something like, “The same thing is at once the thing numbered and not 
the thing numbered.”  This would be to simultaneously affirm and deny the nature of the 
thing on which it depends.  Numbers cannot be free of “images or ‘bodily representations’ ” 
as a Progressivist reading of Descartes’ claims.216  Numbers like “five” can only signify, or 
stand in for, some geometric extension.  They cannot be understood as anything but some 
extended magnitude.   
The view just sketched goes hand-in-hand with Descartes’ insistence that dimensions 
of extension are neither really distinct from each other nor from the extended body.  How 
can a number (which requires the notion of a unit) be distinct from the body if the 
                                                
213 Rule 14; AT X: 445; CSM I: 61. 
214 Rule 14; AT X: 445; CSM I: 61. 
215 Rule 14; AT X: 445; CSM I: 60. 
216 Gaukroger (1992) 110. 
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dimensions (along which any unit of measure is dependent on) are not really distinct?  If 
dimensions do not exist independently of extension, numbers cannot either.  
Even more can be said on this front.  A unit of measure allows us to move between 
multitudes (given by discrete counting numbers) and magnitudes (given by continuous 
numbers).  Once we have established a unit, Descartes tells us that “it is sometimes possible 
completely to reduce continuous magnitudes to a set and that this can always be done 
partially at least.”217  This is because we can shift our attention and think about the same 
thing in different ways.  We can use our unit to think of the number of “parts” in a 
continuous whole (a count), thus yielding a set, or multitude.  (If the continuous whole is a 
whole number in the scale of units, there need be no “rounding” error.218)  For example, we 
can take a continuous quantity, like a line segment, and establish the centimeter as our unit.  
Then we can measure our line segment with our unit, and determine that it is 5 centimeters 
long.  Now, we can think of that same continuous magnitude, the line segment, in terms of a 
number or multitude like 5 by thinking of the line segment as consisting of a set of five unit-
line segments that are concatenated together to form the whole line segment we have 
measured.  We can apprehend the measures of the figure by working with the orders; in this 
way, a figure can either represent sometimes a continuous magnitude, or sometimes a set, a 
number, or multitude.  Comparing extension with respect to the relation of measure differs 
from comparing extension with respect to the relation of order only insofar as we are 
considering the extension as a multitude or a magnitude.  Given that the objects of geometry 
and the objects of algebra have the same nature, it is clear from methodological 
                                                
217 Rule 14; AT X: 452; CSM I: 65. 
218 Indeed, if the continuous whole is a rational number in this scale, there still needn’t be any 
rounding error, but the units may not be the same as our original unit. 
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considerations that algebraic entities cannot be different types of things, for otherwise they 
would have different natures. There is, thus, no metaphysical distinction between the 
geometrical extension and the numeric quantity.  For Descartes, it is this metaphysical 
identity that justifies the unification of algebra and geometry; they concern the same nature: 
extension.219  
5. Descartes’ Subordination Of Algebra To Geometry In Focus 
The Progressivist reading (unsuccessfully) attempts to explain the unification of 
algebraic methods and geometrical problems.  Moreover, the proposed explanation is at the 
expense of an adequate explanation for Descartes’ geometrical emphasis.  We’ve just seen 
that Descartes was not the type of mathematical innovator that the Progressivist reading 
claims, but we have also seen that there is a better way to account for the unification of 
algebra and geometry.  But how are we to understand his view of geometrical priority? 
Above, we had noted a problem for the Traditionalist readings.  In accounting for the 
geometrical emphasis in Descartes’ work (something the Progressivist reading cannot as 
explain), the Traditionalists are left without an explanation for how Descartes’ was able to 
philosophically ground the use of algebra in geometry.  
In contrast, my Method-based reading of Descartes’ mathematical views successfully 
explains his unification of algebra and geometry, and is superior to both the Progressivist 
and Traditionalist readings in this respect.  Furthermore, my Method-based reading is also 
able to systematically account for the geometrical emphasis—which was the main reason for 
                                                
219 My reading presents Descartes’ views on human psychology as influencing his 
epistemology.  The way in which we think of things naturally will constrain how we can 
know the nature of things.  On this point, my resolution of the Counting Problem will align 
Descartes with contemporary, empirical research in cognitive science about the use of spatial 
schemas in our abstract reasoning. Cf. Dehaene (1997) and also Giaquinto (2007). 
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favoring a Traditionalist reading over a Progressivist one.  We’ve seen that my 
Methodological reading uses the identity of the natures of geometrical and algebraic objects 
to explain the unification.  But now I will explain how—based on the ordering of what 
needs to be deduced from the other (i.e., relative simplicity and complexity)—my reading is 
able to account for the priority that geometry receives in Descartes’ mathematical practices. 
Despite the metaphysical identity of geometrical magnitudes and numerical quantities 
of multitudes, geometrical magnitudes are epistemologically prior.  We have seen that measures 
of continuous magnitudes can be reduced to discrete multitudes that we can count only 
through the mediation of a unit.  When we regard a geometrical figure as a set or number, a 
unit of measure is required.  But in order to determine a unit of measure, we assume the 
required dimension is specified.  This means that before we can think of a multitude or a 
quantity of measure along some dimension of the extended body, we need to determine in 
what respect we are going to regard it.  This is selected from the many dimensions or 
attributes that are available for us to consider.  To illustrate this, let’s return to the case of the 
book. We could chose to direct our focus and attention to the cover of the book, and pick 
out the dimension “surface area”, which will pick out the quantity of measure as an area.  
Alternatively, we could choose to regard just one edge of a face of the book, thereby picking 
out the dimension of length.  In that case we would be attending to the quantity of measure 
of length.  
But in order to determine what dimension of measure we are interested in, we must 
first determine the object of interest.  This requires thinking of the whole extended object, or 
some aspect of the extended object.  In doing so, we are delimiting in our thought the 
particular way in which we will be thinking of the extension.  We could consider the volume 
of the whole book, in which case the whole rectangular prism is the object of interest; or in 
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focusing on the area of one of its faces, the object of interest is the rectangular cover or face 
of the book. In each case, we will determine a distinct dimension.   Importantly, as we saw 
above, although we might think of the square as a different object from the cube for the 
purposes of determining a dimension of measure, they are really one and the same thing.  
The subject matter of geometry consists in this activity of determining or delimiting 
figures. Geometry concerns the relations of the aspects or attributes that we use to rationally 
distinguish our figure.  Geometry takes as its subject matter the continuous “geometric” 
magnitudes, i.e., dimensions of measure (size, shape, length, area, etc), and then considers 
them as relations and proportions of order.    I explained earlier how these relations do not 
require the mediation of a unit of measure.  Relations of order hold directly between 
comparisons of continuous magnitudes.  We can, for example, use relations of order to 
discover that the interior angles of a triangle can be joined together to equal two right angles 
joined together, as we do in Euclid’s 32nd proposition. 
When we are engaged in the activity or practice of algebra, we consider the 
magnitudes as multitudes and then relate particular measures of these magnitudes or 
quantities. This is distinguished from geometry because it involves relations of measures—which 
require that a unit of measure be specified.  If we are counting (considering the relation of 
order of the parts to the whole), we need to determine a unit of measure before we can 
determine how many there are. E.g., it is meaningless to report that an object is 10, without 
specifying whether our units are feet, acres, tons, etc.  And if we were to use relations of 
measure, and we determined our unit of measure to be a degree, then we could discover 
upon measuring and summing up the measures of the interior angles of a triangle and 
finding them to equal 180°, that it was equal to the measure of the degrees in a straight line, 
or two right angles. 
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It is precisely because units are a measure along a dimension that has already been 
specified that geometry is epistemically prior to algebra for Descartes.  In terms of the 
Cartesian Method, arranging things in order from the most simple and absolute to the more 
complex: geometry (and its relations of order) is prior to algebra (and its relations of 
measure).  Algebra depends on geometry.  Geometry is less removed from the simplest 
nature than algebra. Not only does geometry delimit the extended object, it does so while 
specifying dimensions of measure that allow for the possibility of numeric quantities once a 
unit of measure is assumed.  Algebra concerns the relations of orders of measures; however, 
we cannot specify a measure unless we do so in relation to a unit of measure.  This unit of 
measure is given along a particular dimension of measure.  The dimensions—along which 
there can be measures—are the concern of geometry.  We engage in geometry when we 
consider and determine dimensions and their relations of order.  Only then we can be in a 
position to begin considering the particular quantities of measure along those dimensions 
prior to counting the parts.  Since the relations of measures require there first being relations 
of order, from whence it can be subsequently deduced, the relations of measure depend on 
the relations of order.   
The upshot is that the Traditionalist’s interpretation is wrong.  Descartes’ 
commitment to the priority of geometry over algebra is not some enculturated whim 
independent of his philosophy.  Rather, it is a straightforward consequence of some very 
fundamental and basic features of his philosophical and Methodological views.  Descartes’ 
general views forced him to both  emphasize the epistemic priority of geometry and to 
identify the objects of algebra and geometry, thus unifying the two together. 
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6. Unified Mathematics: A Case Study For Unified Wisdom 
In this paper I have explained the unification of algebra and geometry by showing 
how algebra is concerned with relations of measure and geometry with relations of order, 
and then by explaining how relations of measure are relations of order.  Once this is done, 
their unification becomes inevitable, as they are most fundamentally concerned with 
relations of the same metaphysical nature: extension.   Geometry and algebra regard the 
relationship differently, depending on whether the objects are seen as discrete sets or 
multitudes, or instead as continuous magnitudes.  There is no real, metaphysical difference 
between the two ways of considering the objects, because for Descartes moving between 
relations of order and relations of measure requires only a specification of some unit of 
measure, thereby allowing us to move back and forth between continuous magnitudes, and 
discrete multitudes.  In this way, we are also able to move back and forth between geometric 
and algebraic considerations of the relationship between objects.  However, in all cases, we 
merely regard the same metaphysically identical object, its nature, first as a magnitude and 
then as a multitude.  Since there is no metaphysical distinction between a multitude and a 
discretely considered magnitude, the unification of geometry and algebra is assured.   
The only difference is the epistemic priority of the objects being considered.  That is 
to say, the difference between a multitude and a discretely considered magnitude can be 
understood in terms of the difference between the complexities of the ideas involved.  A 
multitude is more complex than, and depends on, the magnitude.  The multitude is relative 
to the magnitude; the magnitude is absolute relative to the multitude.  Without there being 
first a magnitude (of any dimension), there could be no specification of the unit of measure 
required for any relation of measure.  It is in this sense that the objects of geometry (i.e., 
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magnitudes) are epistemically prior to the numeric considerations of those objects: that is, 
the objects of algebra (i.e., multitudes).   
The picture of Descartes I have presented offers not only a philosophical, systematic 
explanation of the unification of algebra and geometry, but also an explanation for why 
Descartes nonetheless retains a geometrical emphasis.  This geometrical emphasis is not 
merely the result of echoes of the classical geometrical tradition reverberating in his ear—no, 
it its better explained in terms of the same systematic considerations which lead Descartes to 
the unification in the first place.  The fact that geometry considers the objects more directly 
makes geometry epistemically more fundamental.  Grounding numeric quantities on 
continuous magnitudes is also consistent with claims Descartes makes in the Rules that deny 
the existence of abstract, numeric quantities.  These abstractions are things Descartes’ 
mathematics could not countenance. Moreover, my reading is also in keeping with his claims 
in the Rules regarding his Method for all knowledge.   I do not deny that Descartes’ 
mathematical contributions were in fact innovative and revolutionary; I only claim that their 
brilliance and significance to the development of our mathematics should not be falsely 
attributed to his development of abstract, indeterminate, algebraic entities whose existence 
he firmly rejects.   
What then are we to make of this picture of Descartes?  On the one hand, he does 
not appear to be innovative in the way that the Progressivist readings have maintained.  But 
on the other hand, we have also seen, against the Traditionalists, that this lack of innovative 
numeric-liberation and priority of geometry was due to a very systematic and consistent 
philosophy of mathematics (at least in the present respects).  Rather than importing the 
classical fashions of the day into his philosophy, we see Descartes as taking very seriously his 
own basic principles and methodological rules.  Moreover, in true Cartesian fashion, he lets 
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them lead the way to particular conclusions, whether they are popular, innovative, or 
anything else.  While Traditionalists readings were able to account for priority at the cost of 
unity, and Progressivists were able to account for unity only at the cost of priority, I am able 
to account for both unity and priority by using Descartes’ Method. This allows for a 
philosophically systematic understanding of Descartes’ mathematical practices and his 
philosophy of mathematics that avoids the philosophically superficial reading offered by 
Traditionalists, as well as the textual problems of the Progressivists. 
But more than just Descartes’ philosophy of mathematics is better understood by his 
method.  Descartes’ universal mathematics, as given in the Rules, is not so much a Method 
for mere mathematical computation, but a method for all the sciences.  This is not to say 
that mathematics such as algebra or geometry, trifling though they may be, has no value to 
Descartes at all.  Indeed, Descartes thinks that mathematics has something important to 
offer us.220  What Descartes finds valuable about the study of mathematics is the training of 
our minds in his Method, which we can then use for a proper scientific investigation that 
yields knowledge of the true natures of things.221 
                                                
220 Rule 10; AT X: 404; CSM I: 35: Number-games and any games involving arithmetic, and 
the like, belong [in the simplest and least exalted arts].  It is surprising how much all these 
activities exercise our minds, provided of course we discover them for ourselves and not 
from others.  For, since nothing in these activities remains hidden and they are totally 
adapted to human cognitive capacities, they present us in the most distinct way with 
innumerable instances of order, each one different from the other, yet all regular.  Human 
discernment consists almost entirely in the proper observance of such order 
221 Rule 14; AT X: 442; CSM I: 59. Descartes writes that “… these Rules are so useful in the 
pursuit of deeper wisdom that I have no hesitation in saying that this part of our method 
was designed not just for the sake of mathematical problems; our intention was, rather, that 
the mathematical problems should be studied almost exclusively for the sake of the excellent 
practice which they give us in the method.” 
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While a study of Descartes’ Method has informed our understanding of his 
mathematics, that is only one of the many things that is covered in Descartes’ universal 
wisdom.  Descartes plays a central role in the modern understanding of the relationship 
between mathematics and empirical science. He made revolutionary contributions to both 
mathematics (e.g., his analytic geometry which unified geometry and algebra), and to physics 
and optics (e.g., his conservation laws, the sine law of refraction, and the determination of the 
anaclastic curve), which, moreover, were often characterized in a mathematical fashion: a 
mathematical-physics.  Yet, Descartes saw them all as a part of a single “universal wisdom” 
or “human wisdom, which always remains one and the same”222.  For example, he wrote in 
the Principles that, “The only principles which I accept, or require, in physics are those of 
geometry and pure mathematics; these principles explain all natural phenomena, and enable 
us to provide quite certain demonstrations regarding them.”223  He also wrote that his “entire 
physics is nothing but geometry.”224  These passages illuminate how Descartes may have 
conceived the relationship between mathematics and physics.   
But if we are to take Descartes’ comments about his Method seriously, we should be 
able to understand his unity of science while also accounting for his identification of his 
physics with mathematics in such a way that it explains why mathematics is applicable to his 
physics (e.g., why numbers and equations are relevant to the surface of a lens in the case of 
the anaclastic curve).  The unity of science is inextricably tied to Descartes’ philosophical 
Method of investigation in the Rules.  Most contemporary scholarship on Descartes’ 
                                                
222 AT X: 360; CSM I: 9. 
223 AT VIIA: 78; CSM I: 247. 
224 AT V: 268; CSMK: 119. 
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mathematics and physics has not adequately considered the role that his Method plays in his 
larger project.  Many dismiss this earlier work as irrelevant to his considered views on a 
metaphysically grounded physics. Instead, his method is taken either to refer merely to his 
use of algebra, or as one designed solely to solve specific problems in mathematics or 
physics that he later abandoned.225  
In contrast, I think we should understand Descartes’ Method as he claims we should: 
as a universal method to be used for all systematic inquiry, a Method he continued to employ 
throughout his corpus, including his metaphysics. The Method is of a piece with his view 
about universal wisdom. For Descartes, knowledge consisted in understanding how simpler 
things composed other things, and his Method instructs us on how to arrange these 
component parts serially in chains of thought so we can see the interconnections among the 
composite things while reducing them to their most fundamental, simple natures. The 
discerning and ordering of the parts of these complexes will explain how, and to what 
extent, these complexes are related. 
All this would suggest that our understanding of Descartes’ philosophy, and how he 
came to see the unity of science, is best seen when viewed though the lenses of the Method 
with which he used.   It will help us take Descartes’ seemingly diverse contributions, and 
appropriately focus them so that we can correctly see how Descartes saw the convergence of 
his natural philosophy (e.g., physics), mathematics (e.g., geometry, algebra), and metaphysics 
(e.g., the essence of matter) into a single, unified science. This is an attractive position because 
showing how physical objects and mathematical objects both consist in the exact same nature 
                                                
225 For discussions and debates about the nature and continuity of Descartes’ method, see 
Alexandrescu (2009); Beck (1952); Dear (1998); Flage and Bonnen (1999); Garber (1992), 
(2000), (2002); Machamer and Maguire (2009); Sasaki (2003); Shuster (1977); Smith, N. 
(2010); and Smith, K. (2010). 
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can thereby offer an explanation for the applicability and unity of physics and mathematics 
for Descartes that is based on his fundamental metaphysics and epistemology. 
Of course, the larger project of understanding the whole of Descartes’ mathematical 
physics cannot be attempted here, but it does suggest an interesting, larger, interpretive 
project for further investigation.  The larger project of reconstructing Descartes’ unification 
of science and the applicability of mathematics to physics will show the natures of 
mathematical and physical objects to be identical in the same way that the objects of 
geometry and algebra are identical.  This shared nature, as we have seen above in the case of 
mathematical objects, is geometrical extension—or what we know from his metaphysics as 
extended substance.  Descartes’ Method uses the combining of simple natures into complicated 
and obscure compounds to explain the diversity of our ideas.  Here, I showed how this 
difference in ordering could explain the difference between algebra and geometry, despite 
their metaphysical identity.  I suggest this difference in the complexity of compounded 
natures is also what will account for the apparent differences between the objects of 
mathematics, the objects of physics, and the material substance of Descartes’ metaphysics.  
And just as the ordering of magnitudes and multitudes in the case of Descartes’ analytic 
geometry can explain how they all reduce to the same simple nature, Descartes’ Method will 
also show how the objects of mathematics, the objects of physics and material substance all 
reduce to the same simple nature.   I believe the complete unification of mathematics and 
physics, as Descartes understood it, can be explained in a fashion consistent with and 
informed by the Method he lays out in the Rules.  The result is a beautiful, elegant and 
complex systematic account of the major philosophical issues in the 17th century.  
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